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Abstract
We consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder
has a binary support. We prove that in this context the second price auction yields a higher expected
revenue than the ﬁrst price auction for a broad set of parameter values, although the opposite result
is common in the literature on asymmetric auctions. For instance, when the probabilities of high
values are the same, the second price auction is superior unless the distribution of a bidder’s
valuation ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of the other bidder’s valuation "in a
strong sense". We prove that this result extends to some degree to the case of unequal probabilities,
and to the case in which the valuation of each bidder is a three-point set. In addition, we show
that in some cases the revenue in the ﬁrst price auction decreases when all the valuations increase.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D44, D82.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper is about a seller’s preferences between a ﬁrst price auction (FPA from now on) and a
second price/Vickrey auction (SPA from now on) when the bidders’ valuations are independently
but asymmetrically distributed. Precisely, we consider a setting with two bidders such that the
valuation of each bidder has a binary support (in our ﬁnal section we consider supports including
three points). In this environment we ﬁrst derive the unique equilibrium outcome and the expected
revenue in the FPA for all parameter values. Then we compare the revenue in the FPA with the
revenue in the SPA. We prove that the SPA yields a higher revenue than the FPA for a broad set of
parameter values, although the opposite result is common in the literature on asymmetric auctions
(we provide an overview of this literature later on in this introduction). For instance, on the basis
of numeric analysis for some classes of continuous distributions, Li and Riley (2007) claim that ”the
’typical’ case leads to greater expected revenue in the sealed high-bid auction” [i.e., in the FPA]; a
similar point of view is found in Klemperer (1999).
More in detail, we use λ1 (λ2) to denote the probability of a low value for bidder 1 (bidder 2),
and for the particular case in which λ1 = λ2 we ﬁnd the following results.
• The revenue in the FPA may decrease when all the valuations increase, because increasing
the high value of one bidder may induce his opponent to bid less aggressively. This makes
the FPA inferior to the SPA.1
• The SPA is more proﬁtable than the FPA for the seller if a bidder’s valuation is more variable
than the other bidder’s valuation,2 or if the distribution of a bidder’s valuation ﬁrst order
stochastically dominates the distribution of his opponent’s valuation — but not too strongly.
C o n v e r s e l y ,t h eF P Ai ss u p e r i o rt ot h eS P Ai ft h el o wv a l u eo fab i d d e ri ss u ﬃciently larger
than the high value of the other bidder.3
When λ1 6= λ2 we show that several of the above results still hold, whereas others do not.
Furthermore we show that the SPA dominates theF P Ai ft h eb i d d e r s ’h i g hv a l u e sa r et h es a m e .
Finally, we examine a particular setting in which each bidder’s valuation has a three-point
support, and for some small asymmetries we prove the same results we have obtained for binary
supports when λ1 = λ2.
1This result contrasts with a claim in Maskin and Riley (1985) for the case in which the only deviation from a
symmetric setting is given by unequal high valuations [this claim is reproduced in Klemperer (1999)]. However, for
this case Maskin and Riley (1983) agree with our ranking between the FPA and the SPA
2After Vickrey (1961), this is the ﬁrst ranking result in the theoretical literature which does not rely on ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance among the distributions of valuations.
3Doni and Menicucci (2011) study a procurement setting in which the auctioneer privately observes the qualities
of the products oﬀered by the suppliers and needs to decide how much of the own information on qualities should be
revealed to suppliers before a (ﬁrst score) auction is held. Our results on the comparison between the FPA and the
SPA when λ1 = λ2 contribute to determining the best information revelation policy for the auctioneer.
2In the rest of this introduction we provide an overview of the related literature. In Section 2
we describe the primitives of our model. In Section 3 we study equilibrium behavior in the SPA
and in the FPA. In Section 4 we present our results on the comparison between the FPA and the
SPA. Finally, in Section 5 we consider three-points supports. Sections 6-12 provide the proofs of
our results.
Related literature The analysis of the FPA when the bidders’ valuations are asymmetrically
and continuously distributed is often diﬃcult because the equilibrium bidding strategies are charac-
terized by a system of diﬀerential equations (obtained from the ﬁrst order condition for each type of
bidder) which has a closed form solution only in very particular cases. For instance, Kaplan and Za-
mir (2010) derive (the inverse) equilibrium bidding functions under asymmetrically and uniformly
distributed valuations; Plum (1992) and Cheng (2006) obtain closed form solutions for some special
cases of power distributions.4 Not surprisingly, matters are simpler if there are only two types for
each bidder, rather than a continuum. Indeed, in such a case Maskin and Riley (1983) derive in
closed form an equilibrium in mixed strategies under the assumption that the bidders’ low values
are coincident.5 Proposition 1 in our paper extends this result, as we remove their assumption that
the bidders’ low valuations coincide.
As it is well known, with asymmetric distributions the revenue equivalence theorem does not
apply, and the lack of a closed form for the equilibrium bidding functions complicates the comparison
between the FPA and the SPA.6 The known results show that there is not a general dominance
of an auction format over the other, but the SPA has been proved to dominate the FPA mainly
in some speciﬁc settings, whereas there exist results which establish the superiority of the FPA
for a relatively broad set of circumstances, and not only for some particular examples. Precisely,
Maskin and Riley (2000a) analyze a setting with continuously distributed valuations and show that
the FPA is superior to the SPA if a bidder’s valuation distribution satisﬁes suitable conditions
(which include log-concavity) and the other bidder’s valuation distribution is obtained by shifting
or stretching to the right the ﬁrst bidder’s distribution. These results are obtained by examining
the properties of the system of diﬀerential equations which characterize the equilibrium bidding
strategies.
Kirkegaard (2011b) provides suﬃcient conditions for the FPA to dominate the SPA and his
main theorem generalizes the results in Maskin and Riley (2000a) [see also Kirkegaard (2011a)].
He makes two main assumptions. The ﬁrst one is that the distribution of the valuation of one
bidder, the strong bidder, dominates the distribution for the other bidder, the weak bidder, in
4Cheng (2010) characterizes the auction environments such that each bidder’s equilibrium bidding function is
linear. He shows that this property requires that either each bidder’s value distribution is a power function, or is the
product of a power function and an exponential function.
5Cheng (2011) employs the same setting of Maskin and Riley (1983) in order to show that in some special cases
the asymmetry increases the expected revenue in the FPA, unlike in the examples studied in Cantillon (2008).
6In order to circumvent this problem, some authors apply numerical methods: see for instance Fibich and Gavish
(2011), Gayle and Richard (2008), Li and Riley (2007), and Marshall et al. (1994).
3terms of the reverse hazard rate. The second assumption is more innovative and is related to a
dispersive order among c.d.f.s, according to which the distribution of the strong bidder is more
disperse than the distribution of the weak bidder; we refer to this assumption as to the ”dispersion
condition”.7 The approach in Kirkegaard (2011b) does not rely on diﬀerential equations, but on a
well known result from mechanism design which establishes that the seller’s expected revenue in an
auction is given by the expected virtual valuation of the winner, at least when the bidders’ lowest
types have the same valuation (see Myerson, 1981). In the SPA the winner is the bidder with the
highest valuation, but reverse hazard rate dominance and the dispersion condition imply that when
the two bidders have the same valuation, the weak bidder has a higher virtual valuation than the
strong bidder. Thus it is intuitive that the FPA is superior to the SPA if the weak bidder wins
more often in the FPA than in the SPA. In fact, the property of reverse hazard rate dominance
implies that in the FPA the weak bidder is more aggressive than the strong bidder, and therefore
sometimes he wins even though his valuation is smaller than the valuation of the strong bidder.
However, in some states of the world the weak bidder may be ”too aggressive”, and win even
though his virtual valuation is smaller than the virtual valuation of the strong bidder. This makes
the comparison between the FPA and the SPA not immediate, but Kirkegaard (2011b) shows that
there is no ambiguity in expectation under the dispersion condition, as it implies that the expected
virtual valuation of the winner (conditional on each given value of the weak bidder) is larger in the
FPA than in the SPA.
As we mentioned above, some papers identify settings in which the seller prefers the SPA. For
instance, Vickrey (1961) examines the case in which a bidder’s valuation is common knowledge and
the other bidder’s value is uniformly distributed. The SPA dominates the FPA if the commonly
known value is low enough. Maskin and Riley (2000a) consider the case in which a bidder’s
distribution is obtained from the other bidder’s distribution by shifting some probability mass to
the lower end-point, and in this case the SPA is superior if the initial distribution has an increasing
hazard rate. In the binary setting we mentioned above, Maskin and Riley (1983) show that the SPA
is better than the FPA if the bidders’ high values are approximately equal, or if the probabilities
of a high value are approximately equal.8
We compare the FPA with the SPA in the binary setting without the assumption that low
values are equal, and ﬁnd that for a broad set of parameters the SPA is superior to the FPA,
as described above. Often, in order for the FPA to dominate the SPA it is necessary that the
distribution of a bidder’s valuation ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of the other
bidder’s valuation ”in a strong sense”. For instance, for a not too large distribution shift we ﬁnd
that the SPA is superior to the FPA, unlike in Maskin and Riley (2000a).
7Clearly, these conditions are not necessary for the FPA to dominate the SPA. Lebrun (1996) and Cheng (2006)
prove that the FPA is superior for some power distributions which violate the assumptions in Kierkegaard (2011b).
8Other speciﬁc cases in which SPA dominates FPA are found by Cheng (2010), in environments such that the
equilibrium bidding functions for the FPA are linear, and by Gavious and Minchuk (2010), in examples such that the
valuations’ distributions are close to the uniform distribution.
42 The model
A (female) seller owns an indivisible object which is worthless to her and faces two (male) bidders.
Let v1 (v2) denote the monetary valuation for the object of bidder 1 (bidder 2), which he privately
observes; v1 and v2 are independently distributed. The set {v1L,v 1H} i st h es u p p o r tf o rv1,w i t h
0 <v 1L <v 1H and λ1 ≡ Pr{v1 = v1L} ∈ (0,1). Likewise, the support for v2 is {v2L,v 2H} with
0 <v 2L <v 2H and λ2 ≡ Pr{v2 = v2L} ∈ (0,1). Without loss of generality we assume that
v1L ≤ v2L. Both the seller and bidders are risk neutral, and a bidder’s utility if he wins is given
by his valuation for the object minus the price paid to the seller; his utility if he loses is zero. We
use ij to denote bidder i when his valuation is vij,t h u sf o ri n s t a n c e2L is the type of bidder 2 with
valuation v2L.
The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate the relative proﬁtability of the FPA and the SPA
for the seller. In either of these auctions each bidder submits simultaneously a nonnegative sealed
bid, and the bidder who makes the highest bid wins the object (if the bidders tie, the winner is
selected according to a speciﬁed tie-breaking rule: see next section). In the FPA the winning bidder
pays the own bid; in the SPA he pays the loser’s bid (i.e., the second highest bid).
3 Equilibrium bidding
3.1 SPA
It is well known that when bidders have private values, in the SPA it is weakly dominant for
each bidder to bid the own valuation. Thus the seller’s expected revenue RS is the expectation of





λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)(λ2v2L +( 1− λ2)v2H) if v2H ≤ v1H
λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)(λ2v2L +( 1− λ2)v1H) if v2L ≤ v1H <v 2H
λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)v1H if v1H <v 2L
. (1)
For future reference, we denote with A the region of valuations such that v1L ≤ v2L <v 2H ≤
v1H,w i t hB the region such that v1L ≤ v2L ≤ v1H <v 2H,a n dw i t hC the region such that
v1L <v 1H <v 2L <v 2H. Therefore, (1) says that RS = λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)(λ2v2L +( 1− λ2)v2H) in
region A; RS = λ1v1L +(1−λ1)(λ2v2L +(1−λ2)v1H) in region B; RS = λ1v1L +(1−λ1)v1H in C.
Notice that RS does not depend on v2H in regions B and C, and does not depend on v2L in region
C.
3.2 FPA
The analysis for the FPA is less immediate than for the SPA. In fact, ﬁnding the closed form for
the equilibrium bidding strategies for an FPA with asymmetrically distributed valuations is often
impossible when valuations are continuously distributed. However, this is not the case given our
assumptions on the distributions of v1 and v2 (we consider equilibria in which no type of bidder
5bids above the own valuation). We typically ﬁnd a mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, but
before describing it we consider a benchmark symmetric environment.
3.2.1 The benchmark symmetric setting
Suppose that v1 and v2 are symmetrically distributed such that v1L = v2L ≡ vL, v1H = v2H ≡ vH
and λ1 = λ2 ≡ λ. We know from Maskin and Riley (1985) that in this case the FPA has a unique
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and it is such that types 1L and 2L both bid vL;t y p e s1 H and 2H play the
same atomless mixed strategy with support [vL,λv L+(1−λ)vH] and c.d.f. GH(b)= λ
1−λ
b−vL
vH−b.T h i s
implies that the object is eﬃciently allocated (i.e., in each state of the world the highest valuation
bidder wins). Therefore, the expected revenue RF in the FPA is equal to the expected social surplus
λ2vL +(1−λ2)vH minus the bidders’ aggregate rents 2[λ·0+(1−λ)(vH −λvL −(1−λ)vH)],t h a t
is RF =( 2 λ − λ2)vL +( 1− λ)2vH (which is also equal to RS).
3.2.2 The equilibrium for the asymmetric setting
For the setting with asymmetrically distributed v1,v 2 d e s c r i b e db yS e c t i o n2 ,w eﬁnd that often
no pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists [the exception occurs when condition (3) below is
satisﬁed], and sometimes no mixed-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE in the following) exists
either. Precisely, when v1L = v2L we ﬁnd that no BNE exists in the standard FPA in which each
bidder wins with probability 1
2 in case of tie (for more details see below in this subsection and
the proof to Proposition 1 in Section 6). However, Proposition 2 in Maskin and Riley (2000b)
establishes that a BNE exists under a suitable tie-breaking rule such that each bidder i is required
to submit both an ”ordinary” bid bi ≥ 0 and a ”tie-breaker” bid ci ≥ 0.9 If b1 6= b2,t h e nc1,c 2
are irrelevant but if b1 = b2 then bidder i wins if ci >c j and pays bi + cj (each bidder wins with
probability 1
2 if b1 = b2 and c1 = c2). Therefore c1,c 2 are bids in a second price/Vickrey auction
which takes place if and only if b1 = b2. In Proposition 1 we consider the FPA with this ”Vickrey
tie-breaking rule”.
We want to stress that this particular tie-breaking rule is needed only when v1L = v2L,s i n c e
existence is obtained for any tie-breaking rule if v1L 6= v2L.P r e c i s e l y , w h e n v1L <v 2L we ﬁnd
that multiple BNE exist regardless of the tie-breaking rule, but they are all outcome-equivalent. In
particular, multiple BNE arise because type 1L (and type 1H in one case) never wins and needs to
b i dw e a k l yl e s st h a nv1L (weakly less than v1H) with probability one, in such a way that no type of
bidder 2 has incentive to bid below v1L (below v1H). Since there are many strategies of 1L (of 1H)
which achieve this goal,10 multiple BNE exist. However, this multiplicity is only related to bids
which are never winning bids and therefore, as we speciﬁed above, each BNE generates the same
outcome in the sense that the allocation of the object, the payoﬀ of each type of bidder and the
expected revenue are the same; therefore multiplicity is not an issue.
9A very similar idea appears in Lebrun (2002), in the auction he denotes with F ¯ PA.
10One example is such that 1L bids according to the uniform distribution on [αv1L,v 1L] with α<1 and close to 1.
6Conversely, when v1L = v2L in each BNE both types 1L and 2L bid v1L, and (generically) also
1H or 2H bids v1L with positive probability; suppose 2H does so (to ﬁx the ideas). Then 2H ties with
positive probability with 1L by bidding v1L,a n di f2 H does not win the tie-break with probability
one, he has an incentive to bid slightly above v1L, which breaks the BNE. On the other hand, under
the Vickrey tie-breaking rule, for a bidder i with valuation vi submitting an ordinary bid bi,i ti s
weakly dominant to choose ci = vi−bi, and in particular c1L =0 , c2H = v2H −v1L > 0 for the case
we are considering; thus 2H wins the tie-break paying v1L in aggregate.11 Given this property on
weak dominance for tie-breaking bids, when we describe a strategy of bidder i we implicitly assume
that to each ordinary bid bi is associated a tie-breaking bid ci equal to vi−bi. Therefore, whenever
a tie occurs the bidder with the highest valuation wins and pays the valuation of the other bidder.
In the BNE described by Proposition 1(ii) below an important role is played by two speciﬁc
bids ˆ b and ¯ b such that ˆ b is the smaller solution to the following quadratic equation (in the unknown
b):
λ2b2+((1−λ2)v1H+(λ1 − λ2)v2L−λ1v1L−v2H)b+((1−λ1)v2H−(1−λ2)v1H)v2L+λ1v1Lv2H =0 (2)
and ¯ b ≡ λ2ˆ b +( 1− λ2)v1H. Precisely, ˆ b is the highest bid in the support of the mixed strategy
of type 2L,a n d¯ b is the highest bid in the support of the mixed strategies of types 1H and 2H.
The values of ˆ b and ¯ b are determined in such a way that the bidders’ mixed strategies have no
mass point at bids larger than v1L, a necessary condition for equilibrium. The assumption (4) in
Proposition 1(ii) implies that ˆ b satisﬁes v1L ≤ ˆ b<min{v2L,v 1H}.12
Proposition 1 Given v1L ≤ v2L, consider the FPA with the Vickrey tie-breaking rule. Although
multiple BNE may exist, they are all outcome-equivalent to the following BNE.
Type 1L always bids v1L and the bids of the other types depend on the parameters as follows:
(i) If
v1H ≤ λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)v2L (3)
then types 2L,2H bid v1H;t y p e1H bids weakly less than v1H with probability one and in such a way
that no type of bidder 2 has incentive to bid below v1H.13
(ii) If
λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)v2L <v 1H <
(1 − λ1)v2H +( λ1 − λ2)v1L
1 − λ2
(4)
then types 1H,2L,2H play mixed strategies with support [v1L,¯ b] for 1H, [v1L,ˆ b] for 2L, [ˆ b,¯ b] for 2H,
in which ˆ b is the smaller solution to (2) and ¯ b ≡ λ2ˆ b +( 1− λ2)v1H. The c.d.f.s for the mixed
11In fact, whenever 1L bids v1L and ties with positive probability with type 2j such that v2j >v 1L,i ne a c hB N E
1L selects c1L =0 , otherwise it is proﬁtable for 2j to bid slightly above v1L.
12See the proof of Proposition 1(ii).
13For instance, 1H bids according to the uniform distribution on [αv1H,v 1H] with α<1 and close to 1.




(1−λ1)(v2L−b) for b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b]
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(1 − λ1)v2H +( λ1 − λ2)v1L
1 − λ2
≤ v1H (7)
then 2L bids v1L and 1H,2H play mixed strategies with a common support [v1L,λ 1v1L+(1−λ1)v2H]










v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
v1H − b
− λ2). (8)
We discuss separately the three results in Proposition 1.
Case (i) When (3) holds, Proposition 1(i) establishes that each type of bidder 2 bids v1H and
wins for sure.15 This occurs because v2L is suﬃciently larger than v1H, which implies that each
type of bidder 2 has so much to gain from winning that it is proﬁtable for him to make a bid of v1H
in order to outbid each type of bidder 1. Precisely, (3) guarantees that type 2L (and thus type 2H
as well) prefers winning for sure by bidding v1H rather than bidding v1L and winning only when
facing type 1L, that is with probability λ1.
Case (ii) I nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s ei nw h i c hv1H is large, (3) is violated and 2L is not very aggressive
s i n c eh ep r e f e r st ob i dv1L and win only against 1L rather than bidding v1H and winning against
both 1L and 1H (i.e., with certainty), as the latter alternative is too expensive. Indeed, 2L bids
in the interval [v1L,ˆ b],w i t hˆ b<v 1H, and with an atom at the bid b = v1L,s i n c eG2L(v1L)=
v1H−¯ b
λ2(v1H−v1L) > 0. This less aggressive bidding of 2L allows 1H to win with positive probability by
bidding in (v1L,ˆ b], which makes his equilibrium payoﬀ positive. This implies that the highest bid
of 1H is smaller than v1H, since each bid in the support of a bidder’s mixed strategy needs to
maximize the expected payoﬀ of the bidder given the strategies of the other types. Therefore also
the highest bid of 2H is smaller than v1H, as we see from Proposition 1(ii). As v1H increases, 2L
becomes increasingly less aggressive: ˆ b decreases and G2L(b) increases for any b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b).T h i s
occurs because as v1H increases, the equilibrium payoﬀ of 1H increases and in order to satisfy the









v1H−b − λ2) for each b ∈ [v1L,¯ b].
15In a setting with continuously distributed valuations, Maskin and Riley (2000a) identify an analogous BNE and
provide the intuition we describe here and immediately after Proposition 2. In addition, Maskin and Riley (1983)
identify the BNE we describe in Proposition 1 for the case of v1L = v2L =0 .T h u so u rP r o p o s i t i o n1i san e wr e s u l t
for the case in which v1L <v 2L and (3) is violated.
8condition of constant payoﬀ of 1H for bids in (v1L,¯ b] it is necessary that G2L puts more weight on
v1L and becomes ﬂatter in (v1L,¯ b].16
Case (iii) When v1H is large enough such that (7) is satisﬁed, type 2L bids v1L with certainty
and 2H bids v1L with positive probability. In particular, the larger is v1H, the less aggressive 2H
becomes, giving higher probability to bids close to v1L. We remark that (7) holds for a large λ1,a n d
thus for a large λ1 type 2L bids v1L with probability one, type 2H bids v1L with positive probability.
This occurs because a large λ1 gives an incentive to bidder 2 to bid b = v1L,a st h i s( l o w )b i da l l o w s
him to win against type 1L, which arises with probability λ1. Finally, notice that when (7) holds,
the equilibrium strategies — and thus the expected revenue — do not depend on v2L.
A well known feature of the FPA when valuations are asymmetrically distributed is that an
ineﬃcient allocation of the object occurs with positive probability. In our setting, suppose for
instance that v1L <v 2L 6= v1H and (4) holds. Then ˆ b>v 1L a n di nt h es t a t eo ft h ew o r l dw i t h
types 1H,2L each type wins with positive probability; thus the highest valuation bidder may not
win.
4 Comparison between the FPA and the SPA
In order to derive the seller’s preferences between the FPA and the SPA we need to evaluate the
expected revenue RF in the FPA generated by the BNE described in Proposition 1. Although we
can express RF in closed form (see Subsection 6.3 in the appendix), the ineﬃciency of the FPA we
mentioned above makes RF a complicated function of the parameters, except when (3) is satisﬁed
(in fact, in such a case the object is allocated eﬃciently). Under inequality (3), the comparison
between RF and RS is straightforward, but when (3) is violated it is more diﬃcult to obtain insights
on the sign of RF − RS.T h e r e f o r ew eﬁr s te x a m i n et h er e l a t i v e l ys i m p l ec a s es u c ht h a tλ1 = λ2,
and then we move to a more general setting without the assumption λ1 = λ2.
4.1 The case in which (3) is satisﬁed
When (3) holds we obtain a simple result, as described by next proposition.
Proposition 2 I f( 3 )i ss a t i s ﬁed, then RF >R S.
Proposition 2 is very simple to prove and to interpret. Precisely, (i) RF = v1H when (3) is
satisﬁe da sb o t ht y p e so fb i d d e r2w i nt h ea u c t i o nw i t hab i do fv1H; (ii) inequality (3) implies
v1H <v 2L and thus from (1) we obtain RS = λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)v1H; (iii) since v1L <v 1H,i tf o l l o w s
that RF >R S. The intuition is that in both auctions bidder 2 always wins, thus RS is equal to
the expected valuation of the loser, bidder 1, but RF is the high valuation of bidder 1. Notice that
any proﬁle of valuations which satisﬁes (3) belongs to region C.
16We describe a similar eﬀect (with more details) in the intuition regarding Lemma 1 below.
94.2 The case in which λ1 = λ2
Under the assumption λ1 = λ2 we ﬁnd the following interesting result.
Lemma 1 Suppose that v1L = v2L = vL, v1H 6= v2H = vH and λ1 = λ2 = λ.T h e nRF is increasing
in v1H for v1H ∈ (vL,v H] and is decreasing in v1H for v1H ∈ [vH,+∞).
This lemma says that in a setting which is asymmetric only because v1H 6= vH, RF is maximized
with respect to v1H at v1H = vH,17 and in particular increasing v1H above vH reduces RF.18 In
fact, it is somewhat surprising that, starting from a symmetric setting, an increase in the valuation
of type 1H generates a decrease in RF.I ts e e m sr e a s o n a b l et oe x p e c tt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nv1H above
vH = v2H makes type 1H more aggressive than type 2H, in the sense that 1H bids (stochastically)
higher than 2H, and this occurs indeed in equilibrium. Crucially, however, it is not that 1H bids
more aggressively with respect to the symmetric setting, but rather type 2H bids less aggressively.
More in detail, notice that given λ1 = λ2,( 7 )i ss a t i s ﬁed when v1H >v H and therefore Proposition
1(iii) applies. This reveals that the behavior of types 1L,1H,2L is unchanged with respect to the
benchmark symmetric setting of Subsection 3.2.1: 1L and 2L both bid vL,a n d1 H plays a mixed
strategy with support [vL,λv L +(1−λ)vH] and c.d.f. GH(b)= λ
1−λ
b−vL
vH−b. On the other hand, now
2H bids less aggressively than under the symmetric setting. Precisely, GH and G2H have the same
support [vL,λv L +( 1− λ)vH], but since G2H(b)=
(1−λ)(v1H−vH)+λ(b−vL)
(1−λ)(v1H−b) it is simple to verify that
G2H(b) >G H(b) for any b ∈ [vL,λv L +( 1− λ)vH), and in particular G2H(vL) > 0=GH(vL).
Since 2H is less aggressive with respect to the symmetric setting, it follows that an increase in v1H
has a negative eﬀect on RF. In fact, the larger is v1H the higher (lower) is the probability that
G2H attaches to low (high) bids in [vL,λv L +( 1− λ)vH]. As a consequence, RF is monotonically
decreasing with respect to v1H for v1H >v H.
Naturally, this raises the question of why 2H is less aggressive than in the symmetric setting.
Suppose for a moment that 2H still bids according to GH even though v1H >v H. Then the payoﬀ
of type 1H from bidding b ∈ [vL,λv L +(1−λ)vH] is (v1H −b)[λ+(1−λ)GH(b)].T h i si so b v i o u s l y
higher than (vH−b)[λ+(1−λ)GH(b)],h i sp a y o ﬀ before the increase in v1H, and — more importantly
—i si n c r e a s i n gi nb because the higher is b, the more likely is that 1H wins and thus beneﬁts from
his higher valuation. In order to make 1H indiﬀerent among the bids in an interval (vL,b ∗],w i t h
b∗ >v L, it is necessary that G2H is ﬂatter than GH, and indeed G2H(b)=
(1−λ)(v1H−vH)+λ(b−vL)
(1−λ)(v1H−b)
has an atom at b = vL and grows more slowly than GH for b>v L. This is how an increase in v1H
generates a less aggressive behavior of 2H. However, notice that the support for the mixed strategy
of 2H is still [vL,λv L +( 1− λ)vH], which requires that type 1H still bids like in the symmetric
setting in order to make 2H indiﬀerent among all the bids in [vL,λv L +( 1− λ)vH].19
17This fact may appear similar to the main message in Cantillon (2008), but in fact in our analysis the benchmark
symmetric setting is ﬁxed, whereas in Cantillon (2008) it is not.
18Obviously, an analogous result holds if v1H is kept ﬁxed and v2H is allowed to vary.
19Lebrun (1998) considers a setting with continuously distributed valuations and assumes that the valuation dis-
tribution of one bidder changes into a new distribution which dominates the previous one in the sense of reverse
10Lemma 1 suggests a simple result. Suppose that we start from the benchmark symmetric
setting and let RF∗ denote the resulting expected revenue. Then suppose that the valuation of
1H is increased; this reduces the revenue below RF∗ by Lemma 1. Finally, increase slightly the
valuations of 1L,2L,2H.S i n c e RF is a continuous function of the parameters, we infer that RF
remains smaller than RF∗, although the valuation of each type has increased with respect to the
symmetric setting.
Proposition 3 Consider the symmetric setting described in Subsection 3.2.1. Then, by suitably
increasing the valuation of each type (but not each valuation by the same amount) we obtain a
setting in which the revenue from the FPA is reduced.
An instance in which the result in this proposition is obtained is such that v1L = v2L = 100,
v1H = v2H =2 0 0and λ1 = λ2 = 1
2;t h e nRF∗ = 125. However, if v1L = v2L = 105, v1H = 400 and
v2H =2 0 5 ,t h e nRF ' 123.12.
Next proposition describes a set of circumstances which imply RS >R F given λ1 = λ2.I n
doing so, it relies on Lemma 1 and on the fact that the BNE described by Proposition 1(iii) is
independent of v2L,f o rv2L ∈ [v1L,v 2H). The rest of this subsection is devoted to discussions and
intuitions for these results.
Proposition 4 Suppose that λ1 = λ2 ≡ λ.
(i) RS >R F if at least one of the following conditions is satisﬁed:
v1L = v2L and v1H 6= v2H; (9)
v1L <v 2L <v 2H ≤ v1H; (10)
v1L ≤ v2L ≤ v1H <v 2H with v2L close to v1L; (11)
v1L <v 2L <v 2H with v2L ≤ v1H +
2λ − 1
3 − 2λ




(ii) For values such that v1L <v 1H <v 2L <v 2H, the diﬀerence RF − RS is increasing in v2L.
In terms of the regions A,B,C introduced in Subsection 3.1, Proposition 4(i) [condition (10)]
reveals that RS >R F in region A. The inequality RS >R F holds also in region B for v2L close
to v1L, and in the whole region B if λ ≥ 1
2: see conditions (11) and (12).20 Figure 1 in Subsection
4.2.3 provides a graphical representation of these results for the case of λ ≥ 1
2.
Finally, Proposition 4(ii) establishes that in region C, RF − RS is increasing with respect to
v2L, that is an increase in v2L favors the FPA with respect to the SPA. This is consistent with
Proposition 2, since an increase in v2L brings us closer to satisfying (3), which implies RF >R S.
hazard rate domination (the support is unchanged). He show that, as a consequence, for each bidder the new bid
distribution ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the initial bid distribution, and thus the expected revenue increases.
20In particular, the SPA is better than the FPA for any small deviation from the symmetric setting, that is when
v2L − v1L and v2H − v1H are close to zero, but v2L − v1L > 0 and/or v2H − v1H 6=0 .
114.2.1 Condition (9): v1L = v2L and v1H 6= v2H
We start by considering (9), and suppose that v1H >v 2H. Then from Lemma 1 we deduce that
RS >R F since an increase in v1H above v2H reduces RF but does not aﬀect the distribution of
min{v1,v 2}, and thus RS does not change.
For the case of v1H <v 2H, consider the symmetric setting with low valuations both equal to
v1L = v2L and high valuations both equal to v1H;t h e nRF = RS. Now increase the valuation of
type 2H above v1H to obtain the asymmetric setting we are considering. Although RS does not
change, the logic of Lemma 1 (see footnote 18) reveals that RF decreases. Hence RF <R S.
We have thus established that (9) implies RS >R F as a corollary of Lemma 1, but we notice
that Maskin and Riley (1985) (in their Section III) consider the setting of Proposition 4, except
that they assume v1L = v2L =0 , and claim that an increase in v2H above v1H favors the FPA
over the SPA, in contrast with Proposition 4. However, they do not provide a formal proof of their
claim. On the other hand, Maskin and Riley (1983) conclude that RS >R F, consistently with
Proposition 4(i): see their Figure 1 between pages 18 and 19.21
4.2.2 Condition (10): v1L <v 2L <v 2H ≤ v1H
Condition (10) has eﬀects which are almost straightforward. In case that v2H = v1H,( 7 )i ss a t i s ﬁed
and Proposition 1(iii) applies. Hence RF is equal to the revenue in the symmetric setting with
both low valuations equal to v1L since (as we mentioned in Subsection 3.2.2) RF does not depend
on v2L ∈ (v1L,v 2H). However, (1) reveals that RS is increasing in v2L and therefore RS >R F.
In case that v2H <v 1H, suppose ﬁrst that v1L = v2L. We know from condition (9) that
v2H <v 1H implies RS >R F, and the previous paragraph explains that an increase in v2L has no
eﬀect on RF, but increases RS.H e n c eRS >R F still holds.
v1 more uncertain than v2 The inequalities in (10) characterize the setting in which v1 has a
wider range of variability than v2; this includes the special case in which v1 is a mean-preserving-
spread of v2. In this setting the ranking between RS and RF is unambiguous: the SPA is better
than the FPA when a bidder’s valuation is more uncertain then the other bidder’s valuation.
Kirkegaard (2011a) notices that only Vickrey (1961) provides a theoretical ranking result with-
out assuming ﬁrst order stochastic dominance between the bidders’ distributions of valuations.22
Precisely, Vickrey (1961) assumes that v1 is uniformly distributed over [0,1] and v2 is common
knowledge, equal to a ﬁxed value a; he proves that the FPA is superior to the SPA for a>0.43.
Now consider in our framework the parameters λ = 1
2 and v1L =0 , v1H =1 , v2L = a−ε, v2H = a+ε
21Since they assume v1L = v2L =0 , Maskin and Riley (1983) do not consider the various cases covered in
Proposition 4, and they do not have the results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 5.
22Gayle and Richard (2008), Li and Riley (1999) and Li and Riley (2007) apply numeric analysis to settings without
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance and obtain mixed results.
12with ε>0 and close to zero.23 This setting is in a sense similar to that in Vickrey (1961) since v1 is
uniformly distributed over {0,1},a n dv2 is almost commonly known to be equal to a.24 However,
Proposition 4(i) [condition (10)] establishes that RS >R F for any a ∈ (0,1).T h i sd i ﬀerence with
respect to Vickrey (1961) arises because in our setting RF is considerably lower than in Vickrey
(1961), due to the fact that type 2L bids v1L =0with certainty (and type 2H bids 0 with positive
probability), as bidding 0 suﬃces to win the auction if his opponent is type 1L, an event with
probability 1
2. It is this incentive of bidder 2 to play ”low-ball” that makes RF small.25 Conversely,
no such eﬀect appears when v1 is uniformly distributed over [0,1] because if bidder 2 bids close to
zero then he wins only against a small set of types of bidder 1. For instance, if a = 1
2 then Vickrey
(1961) proves that bidder 2’s equilibrium mixed strategy has support [1
4, 7
16], that is 2’s minimum
bid is 1
4.
4.2.3 Conditions (11) and (12)
Given the innocuous assumption that v1L ≤ v2L, after (9) and (10) have been considered, the only
class of asymmetry remaining given λ1 = λ2 is such that v1L <v 2L and v1H <v 2H, which implies
that the distribution of v2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of v1. In this setting,
(11) establishes that RS >R F when v2L −v1L is close to zero, a consequence of (9). But in fact, if
λ ≥ 1
2 then RS >R F holds even though v2L −v1L is not small, as long as v2L ≤ v1H, that is in the
whole region B.I nw o r d s ,i no r d e rf o rRF >R S to hold it is not suﬃcient that the distribution of v2
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of v1, but it is necessary that v2L is suﬃciently
larger than v1L;w h e nλ ≥ 1
2, RF >R S actually requires v2L >v 1H, which means that the proﬁle
of valuations is in region C.I nt h i sr e g i o na ni n c r e a s ei nv2L favors the FPA with respect to the
SPA, which is consistent with Proposition 2 as we noticed above.
It is interesting to inquire why a higher value of λ enlarges the set of valuations for which we can
prove that RS >R F and, in short, the reason is that a larger λ makes the bidders less aggressive in
the FPA (but obviously does not aﬀect their behavior in the SPA). In order to explain how (12) is
obtained, recall that in our ﬁnal remark in Subsection 3.2.2 we noticed that in the BNE described
by Proposition 1(ii) the highest valuation bidder does not always win. Conversely, the eﬃcient
allocation is always achieved in the SPA. Therefore a suﬃcient condition for RS >R F is that the
aggregate bidders’ rents in the FPA, UF, are (weakly) larger than the rents in the SPA, US.26 It
turns out that UF ≥ US reduces to v1L + v2L ≥ 2ˆ b when the valuations are in region B,a n dt o
v1L +2 v1H − v2L ≥ 2ˆ b when the valuations are in region C. This suggests that the SPA is more
likely to be superior to the FPA the smaller is ˆ b, which is quite intuitive as ˆ b c a nb ev i e w e da sa n
index of how bidders are aggressive in the FPA, given that the highest bids submitted by types
23Proposition 1 still holds even though v1L =0violates our assumption v1L > 0. However, when v1L =0the
V i c k r e yt i e - b r e a k i n gr u l ei sn e e d e da l s oi fv1L 6= v2L.
24If we set ε =0 ,t h e nv2L = v2H, which violates the assumption v2L <v 2H, but nevertheless λG2L(b)+( 1−
λ)G2H(b) is the c.d.f. of the equilibrium mixed strategy of bidder 2 when v2L = v2H.
25This eﬀect appears also in Example 3 in Maskin and Riley (2000a).
26Each of conditions (11) and (12) guarantees indeed that U
F ≥ U
S.
131H,2L,2H are ¯ b,ˆ b,¯ b, respectively, with ¯ b = λˆ b +( 1− λ)v1H.I no r d e rt oi n q u i r eh o wˆ b depends on
λ, we need to recall that the support for the mixed strategy of type 2L is [v1L,ˆ b],a n dλ(v2L −v1L)
is the rent of 2L, the expected payoﬀ he obtains by bidding b = v1L. Also the bid b = ˆ b needs to
yield 2L t h es a m ep a y o ﬀ λ(v2L − v1L), and this suggests that ˆ b is decreasing in λ [indeed we can
use (2) to prove this result formally].
In Figure 1 we ﬁx λ ≥ 1
2 and v1L,v 1H, and partition the space (v2L,v 2H) in two regions S and
F such that RS >R F if (v2L,v 2H) ∈ S,a n dRF ≥ RS if (v2L,v 2H) ∈ F — obviously, the feasible
values of (v2L,v 2H) a r ea b o v et h el i n ev2H = v2L. In particular, S(iii) is region A, the set in which
(10) is satisﬁed [in this case (7) holds and the BNE of Proposition 1(iii) applies]; F(i) is the set in
which (3) holds [then the BNE of Proposition 1(i) applies]. The remaining set includes the whole
region B and a subset of C, and is such that (4) is satisﬁed — thus the BNE of Proposition 1(ii)
applies. The boundary between S and F is obtained numerically.
insert Figure 1 here
Caption Figure 1: Comparison between the FPA and the SPA when λ1 = λ2 ≥ 1
2. In the dark
grey region S = S(ii) ∪ S(iii) the SPA dominates the FPA in terms of the seller’s revenue. In the
light grey region F = F(i) ∪F(ii) the FPA is superior. Proposition 1(i) applies in the north-east set
F(i), 1(ii) in the set F(ii) ∪S(ii) in the middle and north-west, and 1(iii) in the south-west set S(iii).
Distribution shift and rescaling A particular type of asymmetry considered in the literature is
as follows. Given the c.d.f. F1 for the valuation of bidder 1, the c.d.f. for v2 is F2(v2)=F1(v2 −α)
with α>0,t h a ti sF2 is obtained by shifting F1 to the right, which implies that bidder 2 is
ex ante stronger than 1. In a setting with continuously distributed values, Maskin and Riley
(2000a) prove that under suitable assumptions on F1 (which include convexity and log-concavity)
the FPA generates a higher revenue than the SPA; Kirkegaard (2011b) obtains the same result
under weaker assumptions. In our context this sort of asymmetry is obtained by ﬁxing v1L,v 1H
and setting v2L = v1L + α, v2H = v1H + α,f o rs o m eα>0. From (11) and (12) we can obtain
suﬃcient conditions for RS >R F, but in fact in the appendix we exploit this particular structure
of asymmetry to prove a stronger result: RS >R F as long as α
v1H−v1L ≤ 2λ







These results have an immediate interpretation: In our discrete setting a small shift, that is a
small α>0, favors the SPA over the FPA, whereas the result is reversed for a large shift.27 On the
other hand, in their numeric analysis applied to continuous distributions, Li and Riley (2007) ﬁnd
that a shift ”can result in economically very signiﬁcant revenue diﬀerences [in favor of the FPA]”
for examples with uniform or truncated normal distributions, and claim that ”Analysis of other
distributions also produces broadly similar results”. Our results show that this claim does not hold
in a setting with binary supports.
27For instance, R
F >R





14In fact, it is possible to see the result that RS >R F for a small shift as a consequence of
Lemma 1. Precisely, (i) for α =0there is no shift and we are in the benchmark symmetric setting








=0 ; (iii) for any α>0,( 4 )
holds and thus (6) in Proposition 1(ii) reveals that a small α>0 generates a zero ﬁrst order change
in the bidding of types 2L and 2H; (iv) the logic of Lemma 1 [see footnote 18, or equivalently see
(5)] reveals that 1H bids less aggressively for a small α>0 than for α =0 . Therefore a small shift
reduces RF but increases RS, which implies RF <R S.
Example 4 in Kirkegaard (2011a) starts from F2 such that F2(ev) is convex and log-concave
and obtains F1 as F1(v)=F2(γv) for some γ>1 and not too large; thus v1 is a rescaling of v2,
and Kirkegaard (2011a) proves that RF >R S. In our context this sort of asymmetry is obtained
by ﬁxing v2L,v 2H and setting v1L = 1
γv2L, v1H = 1
γv2H. The comparison between the SPA and
the FPA yields results which are diﬀerent from those in Kirkegaard (2011a), but are similar to the
results obtained for a shift. Precisely, (11) reveals that RS >R F if γ is not much larger than 1
(i.e., for a small rescaling), whereas a large γ makes (3) satisﬁed and thus RF >R S.
4.2.4 The distribution of bids in the FPA and the bidders’ preferences
For i =1 ,2,l e tGi denote the ex ante c.d.f. of the equilibrium bids submitted by bidder i in the
FPA, that is Gi(b)=λGiL(b)+(1−λ)GiH(b). Using Proposition 1 we can compare the equilibrium
bid distributions of bidder 1 and 2 in the FPA, and we ﬁnd that G2 ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates G1 when v2H >v 1H; the opposite result obtains if v1H >v 2H. Notice that when
v2H >v 1H, the distribution of v2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of v1 and
the result that G2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G1 agrees with Corollary 1 in Kirkegaard
(2009), for a setting with continuous distributions. On the other hand, when v2H <v 1H there
is no ﬁrst order stochastic dominance between the distribution of v1 and v2, but second order
stochastic dominance applies if v1H ≤ v2H + λ
1−λ(v2L − v1L), that is if the expected value of v2 is
weakly larger than the expected value of v1. Under second order stochastic dominance between the
valuations distributions, Proposition 5 in Kirkegaard (2009) shows that the bid distributions must
cross, whereas we ﬁnd that G1 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G2.
Proposition 1 also allows us to compare the bidders’ payoﬀs in the FPA with their payoﬀsi n
the SPA: it turns out that bidder 1 weakly prefers the FPA, whereas bidder 2 weakly prefers the
SPA. These results largely agree with the results in Propositions 3.3(ii) and 3.6 in Maskin and Riley
(2000a).
4.2.5 Relationship with Kirkegaard (2011b)
Proposition 4(i) reveals that RS >R F for a broad set of deviations from the benchmark symmetric
setting, provided that λ1 = λ2. On the other hand, a frequent result in the literature on asymmetric
auctions is that RF >R S. Since the most general theoretical results are obtained in Kirkegaard
(2011b), we explain why his analysis does not apply to our setting.
15Kirkegaard (2011b) considers a two-bidder environment with supports [β1,α 1] for v1 and [β2,α 2]
for v2 such that β1 ≤ β2 and α1 <α 2. The c.d.f.s F1,F 2 have no atoms and have continuous and
positive densities f1,f 2 in the respective supports; moreover, 1 is ex ante weaker than 2 in the sense
that F2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F1. A crucial ingredient for the result is r(v),w h i c h
is deﬁned as F−1
2 [F1(v)] for each v ∈ [β1,α 1],t h a ti sr(v) satisﬁes Pr{v2 ≤ r(v)} =P r {v1 ≤ v}
and r(v) ≥ v as F2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates F1. The main result in Kirkegaard (2011b),






for any v ∈ [β1,α 1] ∩ [β2,α 2];( 1 3 )
f1(v) ≥ f2(x) for any x ∈ [v,r(v)] and any v ∈ [β1,α 1].( 1 4 )
This theorem results from a clever application of the mechanism design techniques introduced
by Myerson (1981), and precisely relies on the following argument. The expected revenue in either
auction is given by the expected virtual valuation of the winning bidder minus the rents of the
lowest types β1 and β2 of the two bidders. In the SPA bidder 1 wins if and only if v1 >v 2.
However, (13) and (14) imply that the virtual valuation of 1 is larger than the virtual valuation of
2 when valuations are equal, which suggests that it is proﬁtable to have 1 winning the auction if
v1 = v2,o ri fv1 is slightly larger than v2. In fact, (13) implies that in the FPA bidder 1 bids higher
than 2 for equal valuations. Thus 1 wins when v2 <v 1,a n da l s ow h e nv2 <k F(v1) for a certain
function kF such that v<k F(v) ≤ r(v) (the latter inequality means that the ex ante equilibrium
bid distribution of 2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the ex ante bid distribution of 1). This
suggests that the FPA is more proﬁtable than the SPA, but in fact in some states of the world
bidder 1 may win even though his virtual valuation is smaller than the virtual valuation of 2. As
a consequence, it is not obvious that the FPA dominates the SPA, but Kirkegaard (2011b) shows
that if β1 = β2, then (14) implies that the expected virtual valuation of the winner, conditional on
v1, is larger in the FPA than in the SPA for each v1.I fi n s t e a dβ1 <β 2, then the above result may
not hold, but the FPA extracts from type β2 of bidder 2 a higher rent than the SPA, which allows
to prove that RF >R S.






0 if v1 <v 1L
λ if v1L ≤ v1 <v 1H





0 if v2 <v 2L
λ if v2L ≤ v2 <v 2H
1 if v2H ≤ v2
28Condition (13) is a standard condition of dominance in terms of reverse hazard rates. On the other hand, (14)
is innovative and Kirkegaard (2011a) proves that it implies that r(v) − v is increasing, which means that F2 is more
disperse than F1 a c c o r d i n gt oas p e c i ﬁc order of dispersion between c.d.f. Moreover, Kirkegaard (2011a) gives an
economic interpretation to (14) linked to the relative steepness of the demand function of bidder 1 with respect to
the demand function of bidder 2.
16for v1,v 2 in our model, we can approximate ˜ F1, ˜ F2 using atomless c.d.f.29 Precisely, consider two
sequences of atomless c.d.f. {Fn
1 ,Fn
2 }+∞
n=1, with continuous and positive densities fn
1 ,fn
2 for each n,
which converges weakly to ˜ F1, ˜ F2. We prove in Section 10 that for any large n, (13) and/or (14)
are violated by Fn
1 ,Fn
2 .
4.3 The general case
In this subsection we remove the assumption λ1 = λ2. Our results for this case, described by
Proposition 5 below, are less clear cut than when λ1 = λ2, but however they oﬀer some insights on
which format is likely to perform better in diﬀerent settings.
Proposition 5 (i) For any λ1 and λ2, suppose that v1H = v2H.T h e nRS >R F holds as long as
v1L <v 2L and/or λ1 6= λ2.
(ii) The case of λ2 ≥ λ1.
(iia) RS >R F in region B if v2L is close to v1L; RS >R F in the whole region B if λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1}.
(iib) The diﬀerence RF − RS is increasing with respect to v2L in region C.
( i i i )T h ec a s eo fλ1 ≥ λ2.
(iiia) RS >R F in region A.
(iiib) Suppose that λ1 ≥ λ2(1 + ln 1
λ2), and consider regions B and C.I f v2L ≤ v1H or if v2L
is not too larger than v1H,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sv∗
2H (and v∗
2H >v 1H) such that RS >R F when
v2H ∈ (v2L,v∗
2H),b u tRF >R S when v2H >v ∗
2H.I fc o n v e r s e l yv2L is much larger than v1H,t h e n
RF >R S for any v2H >v 2L.
Proposition 5(i) is in a sense quite intuitive, since we know that RS >R F when v1H = v2H if
(i) v1L <v 2L and λ1 = λ2 [from Proposition 4(i), condition (10)], or (ii) v1L = v2L and λ1 6= λ2
(from Maskin and Riley, 1983). Proposition 5(i) essentially veriﬁes that RS >R F still holds if both
inequalities v1L <v 2L and λ1 6= λ2 hold.
As i m p l ew a yt os e ew h yRS >R F when v1H = v2H consists in arguing as in Subsection
4.2.3, and proving that the bidders’ rents are larger in the FPA than in the SPA. Precisely, when
v1H = v2H condition (3) is violated and (7) reduces to λ1 ≥ λ2; therefore Proposition 1(iii) applies
if λ1 ≥ λ2, and Proposition 1(ii) applies if λ1 <λ 2. In the proof to Proposition 5(i) we show that
bidder 1 (bidder 2) strictly (weakly) prefers the FPA to the SPA since (i) 1H earns zero in the SPA
when facing 2H,e a r n sv1H − v2L against 2L;( i i )1 H can beat 2L in the FPA by bidding v1L or ˆ b
(depending on whether λ1 ≥ λ2 or λ1 <λ 2), and both v1L and ˆ b are smaller than v2L. Likewise,
the payoﬀ of bidder 2 in the SPA is zero against 1H,i sv2 − v1L against 1L.T h eF P Ai sc e r t a i n l y
not worse for 2 as he can beat 1L by bidding v1L.30
29Lebrun (2002) establishes that the equilibrium correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with respect to the
valuation distributions, for the weak topology. Given that all BNE are outcome-equivalent at each given information
structure, it follows that the equilibrium correspondence is in fact continuous. Therefore also R
F is continuous, as it
is the expectation of a continuous function of bids (the maximum).
30Here the bidders have the same preferences between the FPA and the SPA, whereas under the assumptions on
Maskin and Riley (2000a) that is never the case.
17Proposition 5(ii) considers the case of λ2 ≥ λ1 and generalizes the results in Proposition 4(i)
linked to conditions (11) and (12). Precisely, when λ2 >λ 1 and v1L = v2L we have that RF decreases
if v2H increases above v1H,a sw h e nλ2 = λ1;t h i sm a k e sRF smaller than RS for v2H >v 1H and
v2L close to v1L. Regarding the inequality RS >R F in the whole region B if λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1},
the intuition is that for a large λ2, v2 is almost commonly known to be equal to v2L such that
v1L <v 2L ≤ v1H. In such a case, we know from subsection 4.2.2 that RS >R F (see footnote 24),
a result suggested also by Example 3 in Maskin and Riley (2000a). Hence, in regions B and C,
a ﬁgure qualitatively similar to ﬁgure 1 applies for the case of λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1},31 and RF >R S
requires v2L larger than v1H.
On the other hand, the result in Proposition 4(i) related to condition (10) does not extend to
the case of λ2 >λ 1 because then RS >R F fails to hold for some proﬁle of valuations in region
A. Precisely, consider (v1L,v 1H,v 2L,v 2H) in region A with v2L very close to v2H, and suppose that
(7) is satisﬁed with equality [(7) does not depend on v2L]. In this case the valuation of bidder 2 is
almost common knowledge, and then Proposition 4(i) [condition (10)] applies even though λ2 6= λ1,
since v2L close to v2H makes the precise value of λ2 almost irrelevant; thus RS >R F.I fn o ww e
consider a reduction of v2L from about v2H to about v1L,t h e nRF is unaﬀected since (7) is still
satisﬁed and the equilibrium bidding in the FPA does not depend on v2L. On the other hand,
the reduction in v2L reduces RS because the revenue in the SPA is equal to v2L with probability
(1 − λ1)λ2 in region A. In particular, RS is reduced considerably when λ2 is large and λ1 is small,
consistently with λ2 >λ 1.I ns u c hac a s eRS <R F if v2L is close to v1L.
Conversely, Proposition 5(iiia) extends the result of Proposition 4(i) [condition (10)] for region
A to the case of λ1 ≥ λ2. The reason is that a reduction of λ2 below λ1 does not aﬀect RF,w h e r e a s
it increases RS [see (8) and (1)].
Proposition 5(iiib) considers regions B and C and shows that when λ1 is large with respect to λ2,
RF >R S if and only if v2H is suﬃciently large. In Figure 2 we ﬁx λ1,λ 2 such that λ1 ≥ λ2(1+ln 1
λ2),
we ﬁx v1L,v 1H, and we partition the space (v2L,v 2H) in two regions S and F such that RS >R F
if (v2L,v 2H) ∈ S,a n dRF ≥ RS if (v2L,v 2H) ∈ F — obviously, the feasible values of (v2L,v 2H) are
above the line v2H = v2L.I np a r t i c u l a r ,F(i) and F(ii) are the sets in which (3) and (4) are satisﬁed,
respectively. The remaining set S(iii) ∪ F(iii) is such that (7) is satisﬁed. The boundary between S
and F is obtained numerically.
insert Figure 2 here
Caption Figure 2: Comparison between the FPA and the SPA when λ1 ≥ λ2(1 + ln 1
λ2).I nt h e
dark grey region S = S(iii) the SPA dominates the FPA in terms of the seller’s revenue. In the light
grey region F = F(i)∪F(ii)∪F(iii) the FPA is superior. Proposition 1(i) applies in the north-east set
31In fact, when λ2 ≥ max{
1
2,λ 1} we prove in Section 11 that R
S >R
F if v1L <v 2L <v 2H and v2L ≤ v1H +
λ1(3λ2−λ2
2−λ1λ2−1)
λ2(1−λ1)(3−λ1−λ2) (v1H − v1L),w i t h3λ2 − λ
2
2 − λ1λ2 − 1 > 0 since λ2 ≥ max{
1
2,λ 1}.W h e n λ1 = λ2 = λ,t h e
inequality v2L ≤ v1H +
λ1(3λ2−λ2
2−λ1λ2−1)
λ2(1−λ1)(3−λ1−λ2) (v1H − v1L) boils down to v2L ≤ v1H +
2λ−1
3−2λ(v1H − v1L) as in (12).
18F(i),1 ( i i )i nt h es e tF(ii) in the middle and north-west, and 1(iii) in the south-west set F(iii)∪S(iii).
Remarkably, this result is the opposite of the result obtained when λ2 is large with respect to
λ1,a si ns u c hac a s eRS >R F in the whole region B. In order to understand the source of this
diﬀerence, suppose v2H = v1H; then we know that RS >R F from Proposition 5(i). For a large
λ1, inequality (7) is satisﬁed and thus Proposition 1(iii) applies for the FPA, as we explained in
Subsection 3.2.2. In this setting, increasing v2H makes both types 1H and 2H more aggressive,
which increases RF.H o w e v e r ,a ni n c r e a s ei nv2H has no eﬀect on RS and RF >R S holds if v2H is
suﬃciently large such that (7) is violated.32 Conversely, if λ2 is large we ﬁnd that an increase in
v2H above v1H may increase or decrease RF, depending on the other parameter values, but however
RS >R F since v2 is almost common knowledge for a large λ2, as mentioned above.
5 A setting with three types for each bidder
In this section we consider a setting in which the support for each bidder’s valuation is a three-
point set. Precisely, the set {v1L,v 1M,v 1H} i st h es u p p o r tf o rv1 and the set {v2L,v 2M,v 2H} is
the support for v2,w i t hviL <v iM <v iH and λL ≡ Pr{vi = viL} > 0, λM ≡ Pr{vi = viM} > 0,
λH ≡ Pr{vi = viH} > 0 for i =1 ,2.W es t i l lu s eRF (RS) to denote the expected revenue under
the FPA (under the SPA). As usual, RS is the expectation of min{v1,v 2}.
In this environment we do not characterize a BNE for the FPA for all parameters values, but
nevertheless we can prove that some of the results described in Subsection 4.2 for binary supports
apply also when the supports for the bidders’ valuations are three-point sets.
Proposition 6 In the setting described in this section, consider the FPA with the Vickrey tie-
breaking rule.
(i) If min{λHv2L +( λL + λM)v1M,(λM + λH)v2L + λLv1L} ≥ v1H, then there exists a BNE in
the FPA in which each type of bidder 1 bids the own valuation and each type of bidder 2 bids v1H.
In this case RF = v1H is larger than RS = λLv1L + λMv1M + λHv1H.
(ii) Suppose that v1L = v2L, v1M = v2M, and for a given value of v2H larger than v2M,l e tI be
a small interval centered in v2H,t h a ti sI =( v2H −ε,v2H +ε) for a small ε>0.T h e nRF is larger
if v1H = v2H than if v1H ∈ I and v1H 6= v2H.F u r t h e r m o r e ,RS >R F if v1H ∈ I and v1H 6= v2H.
(iii) Suppose that v2L = v1L + yα, v2M = v1M, v2H = v1H − α for an arbitrary y>0 and a
small α>0.T h e nRS >R F.
(iv) Suppose that v2j = v1j + α for j = L,M,H,f o ras m a l lα>0.T h e nRS >R F.
For the case in which v2L is suﬃciently larger than v1H, Proposition 6(i) describes a BNE for
the FPA analogous to the BNE in Proposition 1(i). In this case RF >R S, as established by
Proposition 2 for binary supports.
32Notice that R
F >R
S requires v2H suﬃciently larger than v1H, and jointly with v1L ≤ v2L and λ1 suﬃciently
larger than λ2, this implies that the distribution of v2 ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of v1
strongly enough.
19Proposition 6(ii) is analogous to Lemma 1 and to Proposition 4 [condition (9)], since it estab-
lishes that starting from a symmetric setting, a small increase in the valuation of type 1H reduces
RF and thus makes RF smaller than RS. However, Proposition 6(ii) applies only for v1H close to
v2H. The reason is that the eﬀect of an increase of v1H above v2H is not immediate (whereas its
eﬀect is immediate for binary supports) since both types 1M and 1H become more aggressive; 2L
becomes less aggressive; the mixed strategy of type 2H after the increase in v1H is not comparable
with his mixed strategy when v1H = v2H in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. It is
not straightforward to evaluate the net eﬀect of these modiﬁed bidding strategies, thus Proposition
6(ii) restricts to the case of a small diﬀerence v1H −v2H, proving in particular that a small increase
in v1H above v2H reduces RF. Notice however that this implies a result analogous to Proposition 3:
if we start from a symmetric setting such that v1L = v2L, v1M = v2M, v1H = v2H, then a suitable
increase of all valuations reduces RF.33
Proposition 6(iii) is analogous to Proposition 4 [condition (10)], as it shows that RS >R F in a
case such that v2 is slightly less variable than v1 (with v1M = v2M).
Finally, Proposition 6(iv) proves that RS >R F for a small distribution shift, whereas a large
shift makes the inequality in Proposition 6(i) satisﬁed, which implies RF >R S. Hence these results
mirror exactly the results described in Subsection 4.2.3 on distribution shifts for binary supports.
6 Proof of Proposition 1
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1 for the case of v1L <v 2L
For i =1 ,2 and j = L,H,l e tGij denote the c.d.f. for the mixed strategy of type j of bidder i,
with bij =i n f {b : Gij(b) > 0} and ¯ bij =s u p {b : Gij(b) < 1}. Recall that in a mixed-strategy BNE
any bid made by type ij must generate the same expected payoﬀ, that is the equilibrium payoﬀ of
type ij, which we denote by ue
ij.W eu s euij(b) and pij(b) to denote the payoﬀ of type ij and his
probability to win — respectively — as a function of his bid b, given the strategies of the two types
of the other bidder.
This proof is organized in several steps, and throughout the proof ε denotes a number which is
positive and close to zero. We start by recording a feature of any BNE.
Lemma 2 If a proﬁle of strategies has the property that there is a bid b0 such that with a positive
probability type 1j and type 2k tie bidding b0 and min{v1j,v 2k} >b 0, then the proﬁle of strategies is
not a BNE.
Proof. By bidding b0, at least one of these types loses the auction with positive probability; for
instance type 1j.S i n c eb0 <v 1j,t y p e1j is better oﬀ bidding b0 +ε rather than b0 as in this way his
33An instance in which this result is obtained is such that v1L = v2L = 100, v1M = v2M =2 0 0 , v1H = v2H =3 0 0
and λL = λM = λH =
1
3;t h e nR
F =
1400
9 =1 5 5 .¯ 5. However, if v1L = v2L =1 0 0 .1, v1M = v2M = 200.1, v1H =3 1 0
and v2H = 300.1,t h e nR
F ' 155.475 < 155.¯ 5.
20probability of winning increases discretely, whereas his payment in case of victory increases only
slightly.
6.1.1 Step 1: When v1L <v 2L, any BNE is such that (i) ¯ b1L ≤ b1H, ¯ b2L ≤ b2H; (ii) either
b1L = b2L = v1L = ¯ b1L or b1L <b 2L; (iii) ue
1L =0 , ue
2L > 0, v1L ≤ b2L;( i v )¯ b1H = ¯ b2H
(i) The monotonicity properties ¯ b1L ≤ b1H and ¯ b2L ≤ b2H follow from Proposition 1 in Maskin and
Riley (2000b).
(ii) In order to prove that b1L ≤ b2L, suppose in view of a contradiction that b2L <b 1L.S i n c e
2L bids in the interval [b2L,b 1L) with positive probability, it follows that ue
2L =0 . However, since
b1L ≤ v1L <v 2L we ﬁnd that p2L(b) > 0 and u2L(b) > 0 if 2L bids b = b1L + ε: contradiction.
We now show that if b1L = b2L ≡ b,t h e nb = v1L, and as a consequence we obtain ¯ b1L = v1L.
Suppose b <v 1L. We distinguish several cases depending on whether G1L and/or G2L puts an
atom on b; in each case we obtain a contradiction.
• G1L(b)=0[G2L(b)=0or G2L(b) > 0 does not matter]. In this case ue
2L =0as p2L(b) is
about zero for b close to b (as G1L is right continuous). However, since b <v 1L <v 2L we ﬁnd
that p2L(b) > 0 and u2L(b) > 0 if 2L bids b = b + ε.
• G1L(b) > 0 and G2L(b) > 0. This case is ruled out by Lemma 2.
• G1L(b) > 0 and G2L(b)=0 .I nt h i sc a s eue
1L =0as p1L(b)=0 . However, since b <v 1L we
ﬁnd that p1L(b) > 0 and u1L(b) > 0 if 1L bids b = b + ε<v 1L.
( i i i )W en o t i c et h a tue
1L =0both if b1L = b2L = ¯ b1L = v1L and if b1L <b 2L. Hence v1L ≤ b2L,
since if b2L <v 1L then any bid in (b2L,v 1L) yields a positive payoﬀ to 1L.F i n a l l y ,p2L(b) ≥ λ1 for
any b ≥ v1L + ε,t h u sue
2L ≥ λ1(v2L − v1L − ε) > 0 for each small ε>0.
(iv) If ¯ b1H > ¯ b2H,t h e ni ti sp r o ﬁtable for 1H to move some probability from (¯ b1H − ε,¯ b1H] to
(¯ b2H,¯ b2H + ε), since the probability of winning remains 1 but his payment in case of victory is
smaller. If ¯ b1H < ¯ b2H, a symmetric argument applies to 2H.
6.1.2 Step 2: When v1L <v 2L,t h e r ee x i s t saB N Es u c ht h a t¯ b1H ≤ b2L if and only if
(3) is satisﬁed; any such BNE is outcome-equivalent to the BNE in Proposition
1(i)
We start by proving that b1L <b 2L. Suppose in view of a contradiction that b1L = b2L.T h e nS t e p
1(i-ii) imply b1L = ¯ b1L = b1H = ¯ b1H = b2L = v1L.I ti si m p o s s i b l et h a tG2L(v1L) > 0, because in
such a case 1H and 2L would tie with positive probability at b = v1L,a n dt h e nL e m m a2w o u l d
apply. As a consequence, p1H(v1L)=0and ue
1H =0 . However, if 1H plays b = v1L + ε then
p1H(b) > 0 and u1H(b) > 0 since v1L <v 1H: contradiction.
21From the inequality ¯ b1H ≤ b2L it follows that 2L wins with probability one;34 thus ue
1H =0 .
Moreover, (i) ¯ b1H = ¯ b2H by Step 1(iv) and thus ¯ b1H = b2L = ¯ b2L = b2H = ¯ b2H;( i i )v1H ≤ b2L
otherwise any bid in (b2L,v 1H) yields a positive payoﬀ to 1H. Hence, ue
2L = v2L − b2L and ue
2H =
v2H − b2L.
We need to examine the incentives of bidder 2 to bid below b2L, and in particular we notice
that bidding b = ¯ b1L + ε yields bidder 2 a probability of winning not smaller than λ1.T h u s t h e
inequalities
λ1(v2L −¯ b1L − ε) ≤ v2L − b2L and λ1(v2H −¯ b1L − ε) ≤ v2H − b2L
need to hold for any ε>0, and since v2H >v 2L it is simple to see that the ﬁrst inequality is
more restrictive than the second one. Given ¯ b1L ≤ v1L and b2L ≥ v1H,t h eﬁrst inequality is most
likely to be satisﬁed when ¯ b1L = v1L and b2L = v1H, and then it reduces to (3). This inequality is
therefore a necessary condition for the existence of a BNE such that ¯ b1H ≤ b2L.
Bids above v1H are obviously suboptimal for bidder 2 because u2L(b)=v2L − b<v 2L − v1H
if b>v 1H. On the other hand, for bids smaller than v1H the strategies of 1L and 1H need to
be such that no b<v 1H is a proﬁtable deviation for type 2L.35 For instance, we verify that this
condition is satisﬁed if G1H is the uniform distribution over [αv1H,v 1H],w i t hα<1 and close
to 1; recall that 1L bids v1L with certainty. Then p2L(b)=0 , u2L(b)=0for b<v 1L,w h e r e a s
p2L(v1L)=λ1 (recall the Vickrey tie-breaking rule and v2L >v 1L), u2L(v1L)=λ1(v2L − v1L),
but we know from (3) that this payoﬀ is smaller than v2L − v1H, the payoﬀ of 2L if he bids v1H.
For b ∈ (v1L,αv 1H) we ﬁnd that u2L(b)=λ1(v2L − b) is decreasing. Finally, for b ∈ [αv1H,v 1H],
u2L(b)=( v2L−b)[λ1+(1−λ1) b−αv1H
v1H−αv1H] and is increasing for α>1−
(1−λ)(v2L−v1H)
v1H , which implies
that b = v1H is a best reply for 2L.
6.1.3 Step 3: When v1L <v 2L, there exists no BNE such that b2L < ¯ b1H ≤ ¯ b2L
If b2L < ¯ b1H ≤ ¯ b2L,t h e nb2L < ¯ b1H = ¯ b2L = b2H = ¯ b2H ≡ b∗ by Step 1(iv). This implies b∗ ≤ v1H,
and thus b2L <b ∗ implies ue
1H > 0,a n di nt u r nb∗ <v 1H.S i n c e 2H bids b∗ with certainty, it is
proﬁtable for 1H to bid b∗ +ε rather than b∗ −ε, as in this way his probability of victory increases
by at least 1 − λ2 > 0 and his payment in case of victory increases only slightly.
6.1.4 Step 4: When v1L <v 2L,t h e r ee x i s t saB N Es u c ht h a tb2L < ¯ b2L < ¯ b1H if and
only if (4) is satisﬁed; any such BNE is outcome-equivalent to the BNE in
Proposition 1(ii)
The inequality b2L < ¯ b1H implies ue
1H > 0 because ¯ b1H ≤ v1H and p1H(b) > 0 for b ∈ (b2L,¯ b1H).
Next lemma provides a list of features of any BNE such that b2L < ¯ b1H.
34In particular, if ¯ b1H = b2L and 1H and 2L tie with positive probability at b2L,t h e n2L n e e d st ow i nt h et i e - b r e a k
with probability 1, otherwise it is proﬁtable for him to bid b2L + ε rather than b2L (b2L <v 2L since u
e
2L > 0).
35If this property is satisﬁed, then no deviation is proﬁtable for 2H since (v2L − b)p2L(b) ≤ v2L − v1H implies
(v2H − b)p2H(b) ≤ v2H − v1H,a sp2L(b)=p2H(b) for any b
22Lemma 3 In any BNE such that b2L < ¯ b1H the following equalities hold: ¯ b1L = b1H = b2L = v1L,
¯ b2L = b2H; moreover, G2L(b2L) > 0.
Proof. The proof is split in two claims.
Claim 1 ¯ b1L = b1H.
In view of a contradiction, assume that ¯ b1L <b 1H.I f G1H(b1H) > 0 and G2L(b1H) > 0,36 then
Lemma 2 applies since ue
1H > 0 and ue
2L > 0 imply v1H >b 1H and v2L >b 1H.I f G1H(b1H) > 0
and 2 puts no atom at b1H,t h e n2 bids with zero probability in (¯ b1L +ε,b1H] and 1H can increase
his payoﬀ by moving the atom from b1H to any point in (¯ b1L + ε,b1H].I f G1H(b1H)=0 ,t h e n2
bids with zero probability in (¯ b1L + ε,b1H] (in particular, 2 puts no atom in b1H) and then 1H can
increase his payoﬀ by moving some probability from [b1H,b 1H + ε) to (¯ b1L + ε,¯ b1L +2 ε).
Claim 2 b1H = b2L = v1L, G2L(v1L) > 0 and ¯ b2L = b2H.
If b1H <b 2L,t h e n1 H bids in [b1H,b 2L) with positive probability and thus ue
1H =0 : contradiction.
Thus b2L ≤ b1H and since ¯ b1L ≤ v1L, v1L ≤ b2L [by Step 1(iii)] and ¯ b1L = b1H (by Claim 1), we
infer that ¯ b1L = b2L = b1H = v1L. Moreover, given b1H = b2L,i fG2L(b2L)=0then ue
1H =0 ;t h u s
G2L(b2L) > 0. The equality ¯ b2L = b2H is proved along the same lines followed in Claim 1 to prove
¯ b1L = b1H.
Lemma 4 In any BNE such that b2L < ¯ b2L < ¯ b1H, the mixed strategies of 1H,2L,2H are given by
(5)-(6), and they constitute a BNE if and only if (4) is satisﬁed.
Proof. In the following of this proof we use ˆ b and ¯ b, respectively, instead of ¯ b2L and of ¯ b2H = ¯ b1H.
Given that v1L < ˆ b,t y p e s1H,2L,2H are all employing mixed strategies and we can argue like in
the proof of Claim 1 in Lemma 2 to show that G1H,G 2L,G 2H are strictly increasing and continuous
in the intervals [v1L,¯ b], [v1L,ˆ b], [ˆ b,¯ b], respectively. This implies that the following conditions must
be satisﬁed.
Indiﬀerence condition of type 1H:
(v1H − b)[λ2G2L(b)+( 1− λ2)G2H(b)] = v1H −¯ b for any b ∈ (v1L,¯ b] (15)
Indiﬀerence condition of type 2L:
(v2L − b)[λ1 +( 1− λ1)G1H(b)] = λ1(v2L − v1L) for any b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b] (16)
Indiﬀerence condition of type 2H:
(v2H − b)[λ1 +( 1− λ1)G1H(b)] = v2H −¯ b for any b ∈ [ˆ b,¯ b] (17)
From (16) and (17) we obtain G1H in (5). For b ∈ (v1L,ˆ b], (15) reduces to (v1H −b)λ2G2L(b)=
v1H −¯ b and thus G2L satisﬁes (6). For b ∈ [ˆ b,¯ b], (15) reduces to (v1H − b)[λ2 +( 1− λ2)G2H(b)] =
v1H −¯ b and then G2H satisﬁes (6).
36If we consider type 2H instead of 2L, the same the argument applies.
23Since G2L(ˆ b)=1 , we deduce that ¯ b = λ2ˆ b+(1−λ2)v1H, and since G1H needs to be continuous
at b = ˆ b we infer that ˆ b solves (2); here we use Z(b) to denote the left hand side of (2). The
strategies in Proposition 1(ii) require that ˆ b satisﬁes v1L < ˆ b<min{v2L,v 1H}, and since Z(v2L)=
−λ1 (v2L − v1L)(v2H − v2L) < 0 we infer that ˆ b is the smaller solution of (2); moreover, Z(v1L)=







1−λ2 >v 1H needs to
hold. The inequality ˆ b<v 1H is obviously satisﬁed if v2L ≤ v1H, while if v1H <v 2L then it
is equivalent to Z(v1H) < 0.S i n c e Z(v1H)=−[v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2L](v2H − v1H) and
v1H <v 2L <v 2H, we deduce that the converse of (3) needs to hold. Thus (4) is a necessary
condition for the existence of a BNE such that b2L < ¯ b2L < ¯ b1H.
Now we verify that for each type of each bidder the strategy speciﬁed by Proposition 1(ii) is a
best reply given the strategies of the two types of the other bidder. Notice that p1H(¯ b)=p2H(¯ b)=1 ,
thus we do not need to consider bids above ¯ b. The same remark applies to the BNE described by
Proposition 1(iii).
Type 1L. The strategies of types 2L and 2H are such that each type of bidder 2 bids at least v1L
with probability one. Therefore the payoﬀ of 1L is zero if he bids v1L as speciﬁed by Proposition
1, and it is impossible for him to obtain a positive payoﬀ.
Type 1H. We know from (15) that the payoﬀ of 1H is v1H −¯ b>0 for any b ∈ (v1L,¯ b].I fb<v 1L,
then p1H(b)=0and u1H(b)=0 .I f b = v1L,t h e n1 H loses against 2H and loses also against 2L
unless 2L bids v1L,i nw h i c hc a s e1 H ties with 2L — an event with probability G2L(v1L).C o n s i d e r
the most favorable case for 1H, which means that he wins the tie-break against 2L with probability
one (this occurs if v2L <v 1H): his expected payoﬀ from bidding v1L is then (v1H −v1L)λ2G2L(v1L),
which turns out to be equal to v1H −¯ b.
Type 2L. We know from (16) that the payoﬀ of 2L is λ1(v2L − v1L) > 0 for any b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b].
For bids smaller than v1L, the payoﬀ of 2L is zero as p2L(b)=0if b<v 1L.I f b ∈ [ˆ b,¯ b],t h e n
u2L(b)=( v2L − b)[λ1 +( 1− λ1)G1H(b)] = (v2L − b)v2H−¯ b
v2H−b which is decreasing in b, and therefore
u2L(ˆ b) >u 2L(b) for any b ∈ (ˆ b,¯ b].
Type 2H. We know from (17) that the payoﬀ of 2H is v2H − ¯ b>0 for any b ∈ [ˆ b,¯ b].F o r
bids smaller than v1L, the payoﬀ of 2H is zero as p2H(b)=0if b<v 1L.I f b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b],t h e n
p2H(b)=λ1 +( 1− λ1)G1H(b)=λ1
v2L−v1L
v2L−b and u2H(b)=( v2H − b)λ1
v2L−v1L
v2L−b , which is increasing
in b and therefore u2H(b) <u 2H(ˆ b) for any b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b).
6.1.5 Step 5: When v1L <v 2L,t h e r ee x i s t saB N Es u c ht h a tb2L = ¯ b2L < ¯ b1H if and
only if (7) is satisﬁed; any such BNE is outcome-equivalent to the BNE in
Proposition 1(iii)
In this case Lemma 3 (in the proof of Step 4) applies, thus we infer that ¯ b1L = b1H = b2L = ¯ b2L =
b2H = v1L; this means that 2L plays a pure strategy and bids v1L. Conversely, types 1H and 2H
employ mixed strategies and thus the following indiﬀerence conditions need to hold, in which we
24still use ¯ b instead of ¯ b2H = ¯ b1H.F o rt y p e1H:
(v1H − b)[λ2 +( 1− λ2)G2H(b)] = v1H −¯ b for any b ∈ (v1L,¯ b] (18)
For type 2H:
(v2H − b)[λ1 +( 1− λ1)G1H(b)] = v2H −¯ b for any b ∈ (v1L,¯ b] (19)
Notice that G1H(v1L)=0since if G1H(v1L) > 0,t h e n1 H ties with 2L with positive probability
by bidding v1L, and thus Lemma 2 applies. From G1H(v1L)=0and (19) we obtain ¯ b = λ1v1L +
(1 − λ1)v2H, and then (18)-(19) yield G1H,G 2H in (8). The inequality (7) needs to hold since it is
equivalent to G2H(v1L) ≥ 0.
Now we verify that for each type of each bidder the strategy speciﬁed by Proposition 1(iii) is a
best reply given the strategies of the two types of the other bidder.
Type 1L. The same argument given in the proof of Lemma 4 in Step 4 applies.
Type 1H. We know from (18) that the payoﬀ of 1H is v1H − ¯ b>0 for any b ∈ (v1L,¯ b],37 and
b<v 1L implies p1H(b)=0 , u1H(b)=0 .I fb = v1L,t h e n1H ties with type 2L and loses against 2H,
unless also 2H bids v1L — an event with probability G2H(v1L). Consider the most favorable case for
1H, which means that he wins the tie-break against each type of bidder 2 with probability one (this
occurs if v2H <v 1H): his expected payoﬀ from bidding v1L is then (v1H−v1L)[λ2+(1−λ2)G2H(v1L)]
which turns out to be equal to v1H −¯ b.
Type 2L. The payoﬀ of 2L is λ1(v2L − v1L). For bids smaller than v1L we can argue exactly like
in the proof of Lemma 4 in Step 4. If b ∈ [v1L,¯ b],t h e np2L(b)=λ1
v2H−v1L
v2H−b and thus u2L(b)=
(v2L − b)λ1
v2H−v1L
v2H−b is decreasing in b.
Type 2H. The payoﬀ of 2H is v2H −¯ b>0 for any b ∈ [v1L,¯ b]. For bids smaller than v1L we can
argue exactly like in the proof of Lemma 4 in Step 4.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1 for the case of v1L = v2L
6.2.1 Step 1: When v1L = v2L = vL,a n yB N Ei ss u c ht h a tb1L = b2L = ¯ b1L = ¯ b2L = vL
We start by proving that b1L = b2L. In view of a contradiction, suppose that b2L <b 1L.S i n c e2L
bids in [b2L,b 1L) with positive probability, it follows that ue
2L =0 .T h e nvL ≤ b1L,s i n c eb1L <v L
implies that p2L(b) > 0 and u2L(b) > 0 for any b ∈ (b1L,v L).M o r e o v e r ,vL ≤ b1L implies ue
1L =0 ,
but p1L(b) > 0 and u1L(b) > 0 for any b ∈ (b2L,b 1L): contradiction. Therefore the inequality
b2L <b 1L cannot hold in equilibrium, and a similar argument applies to rule out b1L <b 2L.
Given that b1L = b2L ≡ b,w ep r o v et h a tb = vL. In view of a contradiction, suppose that b <v L.
In case that G1L(b) > 0 and G2L(b) > 0, Lemma 2 applies; thus G1L(b)=0and/or G2L(b)=0 .I f
G1L(b)=0 ,w eﬁnd that ue
2L =0since p2L(b) is about 0 for b close to b, but in fact 2L can make
ap o s i t i v ep a y o ﬀ by bidding in (b,v L): contradiction. The same argument applies if G2L(b)=0 .
Thus b = vL, which implies ¯ b1L = ¯ b2L = vL:h e n c eb o t h1L and 2L bid vL with probability one.
37Notice that v1H −¯ b>0 given (7).
256.2.2 Step 2: When v1L = v2L = vL, in the unique BNE 1H,2H play the mixed strategies
described by Proposition 1(iii) if (7) holds; if (7) is violated, then 1H,2H play
the mixed strategies described by (5) and (6) with ˆ b = vL
As in the proof of Proposition 1(ii) (Lemma 3 in Step 4) we can prove that ¯ b1L = b1H(= vL) and
¯ b2L = b2H(= vL). Using again ¯ b instead of ¯ b1H,¯ b2H we infer that G1H,G 2H need to satisfy
(v1H − b)[λ2 +( 1− λ2)G2H(b)] = v1H −¯ b for any b ∈ [vL,¯ b] (20)
and
(v2H − b)[λ1 +( 1− λ1)G1H(b)] = v2H −¯ b for any b ∈ [vL,¯ b] (21)
From (20)-(21) we obtain G1H(vL)= 1
1−λ1( v2H−¯ b
v2H−vL −λ1) and G2H(vL)= 1
1−λ2( v1H−¯ b
v1H−vL −λ2).L e m m a
2 implies that G1H(vL) > 0 and G2H(vL) > 0 cannot hold. Thus we consider the other cases.
If G1H(vL) > 0=G2H(vL) we obtain ¯ b = λ2vL +(1−λ2)v1H and G1H(vL) > 0 is equivalent to
the converse of (7); from (20)-(21) we obtain G1H,G 2H as in footnote 14.38 Now we prove that no
proﬁtable deviation exists for any type. The payoﬀ of 1L (2L) is zero and he needs to bid above vL
in order to win. For 1H, we know from (20) that his payoﬀ is v1H −¯ b for any b ∈ [vL,¯ b] and b<v L
yields u1H(b)=0 . A similar argument applies to 2H.
In case that G2H(vL) ≥ 0=G1H(vL) we obtain ¯ b = λ1vL +( 1− λ1)v2H,a n dG2H(v1L) ≥ 0
is equivalent to (7); from (20)-(21) we obtain G1H,G 2H as in (8). The proof that no proﬁtable
deviation exists for any type is exactly as when (7) is violated.
6.3 Derivation of RF given the BNE described by Proposition 1
6.3.1 The BNE of Proposition 1(ii) when v1L <v 2L
We evaluate RF as the diﬀerence between the social surplus SF generated by the FPA minus the
bidders’ rents UF: RF = SF − UF.T h u sw en e e dt od e r i v eSF and UF:
SF = λ1λ2v2L + λ1(1 − λ2)v2H +( 1− λ1)λ2[v2L +( v1H − v2L)Pr{1H def 2L}]
+(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)[v2H +( v1H − v2H)Pr{1H def 2H}]
and
UF =( 1− λ1)(v1H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H)+( 1− λ2)(v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H)+λ2λ1(v2L − v1L)
38Step 1 and the proof of Step 2 up to this point apply for any tie-breaking rule. However, no BNE exists under
the standard tie-breaking rule if (7) is violated since (i) G1H(vL) > 0 and 1H and 2L tie with positive probability at
the bid vL;( i i )i ti sp r o ﬁtable for 1H to bid vL +ε rather than vL, which breaks the BNE [a similar argument applies
if (7) holds with strict inequality]. On the other hand, with the Vickrey tie-breaking rule we have c1H = v1H −vL > 0
and c2L =0 ;t h u s1 H wins (paying vL as aggregate price) in case of tie with 2L.
26in which Pr{1H def 2j},f o rj = L,H, is the probability that 1H wins when he faces type 2j.
Therefore
RF = λ2(2 − λ1 − λ2)ˆ b +( 1+λ2
2 + λ1λ2 − 3λ2)v1H + λ2(1 − λ1)v2L + λ2λ1v1L
+(1 − λ1)λ2(v1H − v2L)Pr{1H def 2L} +( 1− λ1)(1 − λ2)(v1H − v2H)Pr{1H def 2H}
Derivation of Pr{1H def 2L} For the case that v1H 6= v2L we need to evaluate




1H(b)G2L(b)db +1− G1H(ˆ b)
and using ¯ b = λ2ˆ b +( 1− λ2)v1H in G2L we ﬁnd G2L(b)=v1H−ˆ b
v1H−b:










λ1(ˆ b − v1L)
(1 − λ1)(v2L −ˆ b)
=





(v2L − b)2(v1H − b)
db +1−
λ1(ˆ b − v1L)




(v2L − b)2(v1H − b)
db =
1
(v1H − v2L)2 ln
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
v2L − b
v1H − b
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ +
1





(v2L − b)2(v1H − b)
db =
1
(v1H − v2L)2 ln
(v2L −ˆ b)(v1H − v1L)
(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
+
ˆ b − v1L
(v1H − v2L)(v2L −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
thus
Pr{1H def 2L} =
λ1(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
(1 − λ1)(v1H − v2L)2 ln
(v2L −ˆ b)(v1H − v1L)
(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
+
(1 − λ1)(v1H − v2L)+λ1(ˆ b − v1L)
(1 − λ1)(v1H − v2L)
and
(1 − λ1)λ2(v1H − v2L)Pr{1H def 2L} =
λ1λ2(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
v1H − v2L
ln
(v2L −ˆ b)(v1H − v1L)
(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
+λ2 (1 − λ1)(v1H − v2L)+λ1λ2(ˆ b − v1L)
Derivation of Pr{1H def 2H} For the case that v1H 6= v2H we need to evaluate





and using ¯ b = λ2ˆ b +( 1− λ2)v1H in G2H we ﬁnd G2H(b)=
λ2(b−ˆ b)
(1−λ2)(v1H−b):




(1 − λ1)(v2H − b)2
λ2(b −ˆ b)
































v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H
λ2(v2H −ˆ b)
−
(1 − λ2)(v1H −ˆ b)
(v2H − v1H)
³
v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H
´
thus
Pr{1H def 2H} =
λ2(v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H)








(1 − λ1)(v2H − v1H)
and
(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(v1H − v2H)Pr{1H def 2H}
=
λ2(v1H −ˆ b)(v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H)
v1H − v2H
ln
v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H
λ2(v2H −ˆ b)
+(1 − λ2)λ2(v1H −ˆ b)
Evaluation of RF
RF = λ2ˆ b +( 1− λ2)v1H +
λ1λ2(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
v1H − v2L
ln
(v2L −ˆ b)(v1H − v1L)
(v1H −ˆ b)(v2L − v1L)
+
λ2(v1H −ˆ b)(v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H)
v1H − v2H
ln
v2H − λ2ˆ b − (1 − λ2)v1H
λ2(v2H −ˆ b)








((1 − λ2)v1H +( λ1 − λ2)v2L − λ1v1L − v2H)2 − 4λ2(((1 − λ1)v2H − (1 − λ2)v1H)v2L + λ1v1Lv2H)
6.3.2 The BNE of Proposition 1(ii) when v1L = v2L (footnote 14)
SF = λ1λ2v1L + λ1(1 − λ2)v2H + λ2(1 − λ1)v1H +( 1− λ1)(1 − λ2)(v1H +( v2H − v1H)Pr{2H def 1H})
UF =( 1 − λ1)(v1H − λ2vL − (1 − λ2)v1H)+( 1− λ2)(v2H − λ2vL − (1 − λ2)v1H)
Therefore
RF = λ2 (2 − λ2)v1L − (1 − λ1)(1− λ2)v2H +( 2− λ1 − λ2)(1− λ2)v1H
+(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(v2H − v1H)Pr{2H def 1H}
28Derivation of Pr{2H def 1H} For the case that v1H 6= v2H we need to evaluate
























v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H








(v2H − b)(v1H − b)2db =
1
(v2H − v1H)2 ln
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
v1H − b
v2H − b
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ +
1




v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H
(v2H − b)(v1H − b)2 db
=
v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H
(v2H − v1H)
2 ln
λ2 (v2H − v1L)
v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H
+
(1 − λ2)(v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H)




(v1H − b)2db =
λ1(1 − λ2)
λ2 (v1H − v1L)
thus
Pr{2H def 1H} =
λ2(v1H − v1L)(v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H)
(1 − λ2)(1 − λ1)(v2H − v1H)
2 ln
λ2 (v2H − v1L)
v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H
+
v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H





(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(v2H − v1H)Pr{2H def 1H}
=
(v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H)λ2(v1H − v1L)
v2H − v1H
ln
λ2 (v2H − v1L)
v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H
+(1− λ2)((λ2 + λ1 − 1)v1H +( 1− λ1)v2H − λ2v1L)
Evaluation of RF
RF = λ2v1L +( 1− λ2)v1H (23)
+
(v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H)λ2(v1H − v1L)
v2H − v1H
ln
λ2 (v2H − v1L)
v2H − λ2v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H
296.3.3 The BNE in Proposition 1(iii)
SF = λ1λ2v2L + λ1(1 − λ2)v2H + λ2(1 − λ1)v1H +( 1− λ1)(1 − λ2)(v2H +( v1H − v2H)Pr{1H def 2H})
UF =( 1 − λ1)(v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H)+( 1− λ2)(v2H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H)+λ2λ1(v2L − v1L)
Therefore
RF = λ1(2 − λ1)v1L − (1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)v1H +( 1− λ1)(2 − λ1 − λ2)v2H
+(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(v1H − v2H)Pr{1H def 2H}
Derivation of Pr{1H def 2H} For the case that v1H 6= v2H we need to evaluate
























v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H






(v1H − b)(v2H − b)2db =
1
(v1H − v2H)2 ln
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
v2H − b
v1H − b
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ +
1




v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
(v2H − b)2(v1H − b)
db
=
v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
(v1H − v2H)2 ln
λ1(v1H − v1L)
v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
+
(1 − λ1)(v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H)








Pr{1H def 2H} =
λ1(v2H − v1L)(v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H)
(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(v1H − v2H)2 ln
λ1(v1H − v1L)
v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
+
v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H





(1 − λ1)(1 − λ2)(v1H − v2H)Pr{1H def 2H}
=




v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
+(1 − λ1)((1 − λ2)v1H − λ1v1L +( λ1 + λ2 − 1)v2H)
30Evaluation of RF
RF = λ1v1L+(1−λ1)v2H+
(v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H)λ1(v2H − v1L)
v1H − v2H
ln
λ1 (v1H − v1L)
v1H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v2H
7 Proof of Lemma 1
Given λ1 = λ2 and v1L = v2L = vL,w h e nv1H <v 2H = vH Proposition 1(ii) (footnote 14)




vH−b − λ) and G2H(b)= λ
1−λ
b−vL
v1H−b with support [vL,¯ b],i nw h i c h¯ b = λvL +( 1−
λ)v1H. It is simple to see that both G1H(b) and G2H(b) are decreasing with respect to v1H for any
b ∈ (vL,¯ b), and this implies that 1H and 2H are both more aggressive, in the sense of ﬁrst order











we infer that RF is increasing in v1H.
When v1H >v H, Proposition 1(iii) applies and reveals that types 1L,1H,2L bid as in the benchmark
symmetric setting, whereas G2H(b)=
(1−λ)(v1H−vH)+λ(b−vL)
(1−λ)(v1H−b) for any b ∈ [vL,λv L+(1−λ)vH].S i n c e
G2H(b) is strictly increasing in v1H for any b ∈ [vL,λv L +( 1− λ)vH), we infer that 2H is less
aggressive, in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, the larger is v1H. Using again (24),
after replacing G1H with GH and ¯ b with λvL +( 1− λ)vH, it follows that RF is strictly decreasing
with respect to v1H.
8 Proof of Proposition 4
8.1 Proof of Proposition 4(i)
8.1.1 The proof when (9) or (10) is satisﬁed
The proofs for these results are provided in the text.
8.1.2 The proof when (11) is satisﬁed
Since RS >R F when (9) is satisﬁed and RS and RF are continuous functions of the valuations, it
follows that RS >R F if v1L ≤ v2L ≤ v1H <v 2H and v2L is close to v1L.
8.1.3 The proof when (12) is satisﬁed
If λ ≥ 1
2, then the condition λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1} for Proposition 5(iia) is satisﬁed. Hence the proof
in Proposition 5(iia) applies to this setting to show that RS >R F for each proﬁle of valuations in
region B, that is such that v1L ≤ v2L ≤ v1H <v 2H.
39Precisely, if v1H <v
0
1H <v H,t h e nF1H and F2H given v
0
1H ﬁrst order stocastically dominate, respectively, F1H
and F2H given v1H.
31For valuations in region C,t h a ti sv1L <v 1H <v 2L <v 2H, we show that UF ≥ US, and thus
RS >R F, if (12) is satisﬁed. Since v1H <v 2H, Proposition 1(ii) applies and thus the aggregate
bidders’ rents in the FPA are UF =( 1− λ)(v1H − ¯ b)+( 1− λ)(v2H − ¯ b)+λ2(v2L − v1L) with
¯ b = λˆ b+(1−λ)v1H.S i n c eUS = λv2L+(1−λ)v2H−λv1L−(1−λ)v1H, the diﬀerence UF−US is equal
to λ(1 − λ)(v1L+2v1H−v2L−2ˆ b).F r o m( 2 2 )w eo b t a i n ˆ b = 1
2λ (λv1L + v2H − (1 − λ)v1H − Q) with
Q =
q
((1 − λ)v1H − λv1L − v2H)2 − 4λ(1 − λ)(v2H − v1H)v2L − 4λ2v1Lv2H.T h e r e f o r e UF ≥ US
boils down to Q ≥ v2H + λv2L − (1 + λ)v1H and (after squaring — notice that v2H + λv2L −
(1 + λ)v1H > 0) ultimately to
−λv2
2L +2( 3 v1H − 3v2H +2 λv2H − λv1H)v2L
+λv2
1L − 4v2
1H +4 v1Hv2H +2 ( 1− 2λ)v1Lv2H − 2(1 − λ)v1Hv1L ≥ 0
(25)
We prove that this inequality holds for each v2L ∈ (v1H,v 1H + 2λ−1
3−2λ(v1H − v1L) by verifying that
t h el e f th a n ds i d eo f( 2 5 )i sp o s i t i v eb o t ha tv2L = v1H and at v2L = v1H + 2λ−1
3−2λ(v1H − v1L).A t
v2L = v1H, the left hand side in (25) reduces to (v1H − v1L)[λ(4v2H − 3v1H − v1L) − 2(v2H − v1H)]
which is positive since (i) it is increasing in λ;( i i )h a sv a l u e1
2(v1H − v1L)2 > 0 at λ = 1
2.A t
v2L = v1H + 2λ−1
3−2λ(v1H − v1L), the left hand side in (25) reduces to
8(1−λ)
(3−2λ)2(v1H − v1L)2 > 0.
8.2 Proof of Proposition 4(ii)
Given that λ1 = λ2, the condition λ2 ≥ λ1 for Proposition 5(iib) is satisﬁed. Hence the proof in
Proposition 5(iib) applies to this setting to show that RF −RS is increasing with respect to v2L in
region C.
Proof for the case of distribution shift I nt h ec a s eo fs h i f t ,v2H −v1H = α and v2L−v1L = α.
If α ≤ v1H−v1L,t h e nv2L ≤ v1H and US = λ2(v2L−v1L)+λ(1−λ)(v2H−v1L)+(1−λ)λ(v1H−v2L)+
(1−λ)2(v2H −v1H)=( 1−2λ+2λ2)α+2λ(1−λ)(v1H −v1L). As a consequence, UF ≥ US reduces
to 2λ(v1H − v1L) ≥ (2 − 3λ)α.I f λ>2
5, then this inequality is satisﬁed for any α ≤ v1H − v1L;
if instead λ ≤ 2
5, then the inequality is violated for α = v1H − v1L and it holds if and only if
α ≤ 2λ
2−3λ(v1H − v1L).
If α>v 1H −v1L,t h e nv2L >v 1H and US = λ2(v2L−v1L)+λ(1−λ)(v2H −v1L)+λ(1−λ)(v2L−
v1H)+( 1− λ)2(v2H − v1H)=α. As a consequence, UF ≥ US reduces to 2(2 + λ)(v1H − v1L) ≥
3(2 − λ)α. If order for this inequality to be satisﬁed by an α larger than v1H − v1L it is necessary
that λ>2
5.
9 Proof of the claims in Subsection 4.2.4
When (3) is satisﬁed, G2(b) ≤ G1(b) holds for any b. Moreover, bidder 1 never wins in either
auction when (3) holds. Conversely, 2 wins with probability one and in the FPA he pays v1H;i n
the SPA his expected payment is the expected valuation of bidder 1, which is smaller than v1H.
32For i =1 ,2,l e tUF
i denote bidder i’s ex ante expected equilibrium payoﬀ in the FPA; US
i
is deﬁned likewise for the SPA. When (4) holds we ﬁnd UF
1 =( 1− λ)λ(v1H − ˆ b), US
1 =( 1−
λ)λmax{v1H − v2L,0},a n dUF
1 >U S
1 since ˆ b<min{v2L,v 1H}.M o r e o v e r ,UF
2 = λ2(v2L − v1L)+
(1 − λ)[v2H − λˆ b − (1 − λ)v1H], US
2 = λ[λ(v2L − v1L)+( 1− λ)max{v2L − v1H,0}]+( 1− λ)[v2H −
λv1L − (1 − λ)v1H],a n dUS
2 − UF
2 =( 1− λ)λ[max{v2L − v1H,0} +ˆ b − v1L] > 0 since ˆ b>v 1L.
For the equilibrium bid distributions we ﬁnd G1(b) >G 2(b) for any b ∈ [v1L,ˆ b] as G1(v1L)=
G2(ˆ b)=λ.F o rb ∈ (ˆ b,¯ b], G1(b)=v2H−¯ b
v2H−b and G2(b)=v1H−¯ b
v1H−b, hence G1(b) >G 2(b) for b ∈ (ˆ b,¯ b).
When (7) holds we obtain UF




1 since v1L ≤ v2L.M o r e o v e r ,UF
2 = US
2 = λ2(v2L−v1L)+(1−λ)λ(v2H −v1L).
For the equilibrium bid distributions we ﬁnd G1(b)=λv2H−v1L
v2H−b and G2(b)=v1H−¯ b
v1H−b with ¯ b =
λv1L +( 1− λ)v2H and G2(b) >G 1(b) for any b ∈ [v1L,¯ b).
1 0 P r o o fo ft h eﬁnal claim in Subsection 4.2.5
We consider two sequences of atomless c.d.f. {Fn
1 ,Fn
2 }+∞
n=1, with continuous and positive densities
fn
1 ,fn
2 for each n, which converges weakly to ˜ F1, ˜ F2. We show that for any large n, (13) and/or
(14) are violated by Fn
1 ,Fn
2 .
When v1L <v 2L, select an arbitrary ˆ v ∈ (v1L,v 2L) and notice that given a small ε>0,f o r
a large n the inequality Fn
1 (ˆ v) >λ− ε holds. Therefore rn(ˆ v)=( Fn
2 )−1[Fn
1 (ˆ v)] ≥ v2L − ε>ˆ v
[because limn→+∞ Fn
2 (v)=0for each v<v 2L − ε]a n d
R rn(ˆ v)
ˆ v fn
2 (x)dx = Fn
2 [rn(ˆ v)] − Fn
2 (ˆ v) >
λ − 2ε for a large n.I f fn
1 (ˆ v) ≥ fn





2 (x)dx =0 : contradiction. Hence (14) is violated if Fn
1 ,Fn
2 are close to ˜ F1, ˜ F2
and v1L <v 2L.
Now assume that v1L = v2L and v1H <v 2H. Then given a small ε>0 and a large n,t h e
inequality Fn
1 (v1H + ε) − Fn
1 (v1H − ε)=
R v1H+ε
v1H−ε fn
1 (x)dx > 1 − λ − ε holds, and Fn
2 (v1H + ε) −
Fn
2 (v1H − ε)=
R v1H+ε
v1H−ε fn





2 (x) ≤ t for any x ∈ (v1H − ε,v1H + ε) and any n,t h e n
R v1H+ε
v1H−ε fn







1 (x)dx =0 . Thus for any t>0, for any large n there exists some xn ∈




2 (xn) >t , which implies that (13) cannot hold since Fn
2 (xn) >λ− ε.
1 1 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
(i) Suppose that λ1 <λ 2. Then Proposition 1(ii) applies and the ex ante expected payoﬀs of bidders
1 and 2 in the FPA and in the SPA are
UF
1 =( 1 − λ1)λ2(vH −ˆ b) and US
1 =( 1− λ1)λ2(vH − v2L)
UF
2 = λ2λ1(v2L − v1L)+( 1− λ2)λ2(vH −ˆ b) and US
2 = λ2λ1(v2L − v1L)+( 1− λ2)λ1(vH − v1L)
From (2) we obtain ˆ b = v2L − λ1





33I nt h eo p p o s i t ec a s es u c ht h a tλ1 ≥ λ2, Proposition 1(iii) applies and
UF
1 =( 1 − λ1)λ1(vH − v1L) >U S
1 =( 1− λ1)λ2(vH − v2L)
UF
2 = US
2 = λ2λ1(v2L − v1L)+( 1− λ2)λ1(vH − v1L)
In either case, UF = UF
1 + UF
2 >U S = US
1 + US
2 and thus RS >R F.
(iia) Since λ2 ≥ λ1, inequality (4) holds in region B and Proposition 1(ii) applies for the FPA.
F i r s tw en o t i c et h a tf o rv2L = v1L, RF is decreasing in v2H.I t s u ﬃces to notice from footnote
14 that an increase in v2H has the only eﬀect of making 1H less aggressive by increasing G1H(b).
However, an increase in v2H does not aﬀect RS.S i n c e RS >R F at v2H = v1H, it follows that
RS >R F still holds for v2H >v 1H. As a consequence, RS >R F in region B if v2L is close to v1L.
N o ww es h o wt h a tRS >R F in region B if λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1} by proving that UF ≥ US for any
proﬁle of values in B. The bidders’ rents in the FPA are UF =( 1−λ1)(v1H −¯ b)+λ2λ1(v2L−v1L)+
(1−λ2)(v2H −¯ b) with ¯ b = λ2ˆ b+(1−λ2)v1H. On the other hand, the bidders’ rents in the SPA are
US = λ1λ2(v2L−v1L)+λ1(1−λ2)(v2H −v1L)+(1−λ1)λ2(v1H −v2L)+(1−λ1)(1−λ2)(v2H −v1H).
Hence the inequality UF ≥ US reduces to
(λ2 − λ1)(1 − λ2)v1H + λ1(1 − λ2)v1L + λ2(1 − λ1)v2L ≥ λ2(2 − λ1 − λ2)ˆ b (26)
We show that (26) holds in region B if λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1}. First we notice that (26) depends on
v2H only through ˆ b, and we prove that ˆ b is (weakly) increasing with respect to v2H.P r e c i s e l y ,








.S i n c e ˆ b is the smallest
solution of (2), it follows that ∂Z
∂b
¯ ¯





= λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)v2L − ˆ b and
ˆ b ≤ λ1v1L +(1−λ1)v2L since Z evaluated at b = λ1v1L +(1−λ1)v2L is equal to −λ1(1−λ2)(v2L −




> 0 and ∂ˆ b
∂v2H > 0. Using (22) we see that
limv2H→+∞ˆ b = λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)v2L, hence a suﬃcient condition for (26) to hold is (λ2 − λ1)(1 −
λ2)v1H +λ1(1−λ2)v1L +λ2(1−λ1)v2L ≥ λ2(2−λ1 −λ2)(λ1v1L +(1−λ1)v2L), which is equivalent
to
(λ2 − λ1)(1 − λ2)v1H + λ1(1 − 3λ2 + λ1λ2 + λ2
2)v1L + λ2(1 − λ1)(λ1 + λ2 − 1)v2L ≥ 0 (27)
Since the left hand side in (27) is linear in v2L and v1L ≤ v2L ≤ v1H in region B, we deduce that
(27) holds in region B if and only if it is satisﬁed at v2L = v1L and at v2L = v1H.A tv2L = v1L,( 2 7 )
reduces to (1 − λ2)(λ2 − λ1)(v1H − v1L) ≥ 0, which holds as λ2 >λ 1.A tv2L = v1H, (27) reduces
to λ1(3λ2 −λ1λ2 −λ2
2 −1)(v1H −v1L) ≥ 0,w h i c hh o l d sa s( i )t h el e f th a n ds i d ei si n c r e a s i n gi nλ2;
(ii) if λ1 < 1
2,t h e nλ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1} = 1
2 implies 3λ2 −λ1λ2 −λ2
2 −1 ≥ 1
4 − 1
2λ1 > 0;( i i )i fλ1 ≥ 1
2,
then λ2 ≥ max{1
2,λ 1} = λ1 implies 3λ2 − λ1λ2 − λ2
2 − 1 ≥ 3λ1 − 2λ2
1 − 1=( 1− λ1)(2λ1 − 1) ≥ 0.
Now consider region C, that is valuations such that v1L <v 1H <v 2L <v 2H.T h e n UF =
(1−λ1)λ2(v1H −ˆ b)+λ2λ1(v2L−v1L)+(1−λ2)(v2H −λ2ˆ b−(1−λ2)v1H) with ¯ b = λˆ b+(1−λ)v1H,
and US = λ2v2L +( 1− λ2)v2H − λ1v1L − (1 − λ1)v1H. The inequality UF ≥ US is equivalent
34to −λ2(1 − λ1)v2L + λ1(1 − λ2)v1L +( 3 λ2 − λ2λ1 − λ2
2 − λ1)vH ≥ λ2(2 − λ2 − λ1)ˆ b.U s i n g ( 2 2 )
we obtain that UF ≥ US boils down to a inequality which is quadratic in v2L, with (complicated)






















2 +2 v1Lλ1λ2 − 17v1Hλ1λ2) for
v2L,a n d4(2− λ1 − λ2)
¡
(λ1 + λ2
1λ2 − 3λ2λ1 + λ1λ2






−λ1(1 − λ2)v1L +( −3λ2 + λ2λ1 + λ2
2 + λ1)v1H
¢
as a constant term.
We prove that the inequality is satisﬁed if v1H <v 2L ≤ v1H +
λ1(3λ2−λ2
2−λ1λ2−1)
λ2(1−λ1)(3−λ1−λ2) (v1H − v1L).
In order to do so, we notice that the coeﬃcient of v2
2L is negative, that is 3λ2 + λ2
1 − λ2
2 − λ1λ2 −




λ2(1−λ1)(3−λ1−λ2) (v1H − v1L).I np a r t i c u l a r ,3λ2 + λ2
1 − λ2
2 − λ1λ2 − 2λ1 is increasing in λ2,
and (i) if λ1 < 1
2,t h e nλ2 ≥ 1
2 and 3λ2 + λ2
1 − λ2




1;( i i )i fλ1 ≥ 1
2,
then λ2 ≥ λ1 and 3λ2 + λ2
1 − λ2
2 − λ1λ2 − 2λ1 ≥ λ1(1 − λ1) ≥ 0.A t v2L = v1H, the inequality








2 + v1Lλ1λ2 +4 v1Hλ1λ2) ≥ 0, and since v2H ≥ v1H,
the left hand side is larger than λ1(v1H − v1L)((3λ2 − λ2








which is equal to λ2




the inequality reduces to λ2
1(1 − λ2)(3λ2 − λ1 − λ2
2 − λ1λ2)
(2−λ1−λ2)2(v1H−v1L)2
λ2(1−λ1)(3−λ1−λ2)2 ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e .
(iib) Since RS does not depend on v2L in region C, we need to prove that ∂RF
∂v2L > 0.T o t h i s
purpose we notice that (4) is satisﬁed in region C and we show that ∂ˆ b
∂v2L > 0.T h i si m p l i e s ∂¯ b
∂v2L > 0
and from (5)-(6) it follows that G1H(b),G 2L(b),G 2H(b) are all decreasing in v2L, which implies that
types 1H,2L,2H are all more aggressive as v2L increases. Thus RF is increasing with respect to






















> (λ2 − λ1)(v1H −ˆ b) ≥ 0;t h e r e f o r e ∂ˆ b
∂v2L > 0.
(iiia) Given that λ1 ≥ λ2,i nr e g i o nA the inequality (7) is satisﬁed and thus Proposition
1(iii) applies for the FPA. This implies that G1,G 2, the equilibrium bid distributions of the two





v1H−b for b ∈ [v1L,λ 1v1L +(1−λ1)v2H].H e n c eRF is
independent of λ2,w h e r e a sRS = λ1v1L +( 1− λ1)(λ2v2L +( 1− λ2)v2H) in region A, and thus RS
is decreasing in λ2.T h e r e f o r e ,g i v e nλ2 ≤ λ1, the minimum of RS with respect to λ2 is reached at
λ2 = λ1. Then we can apply Proposition 4 [condition (10)] to conclude that RS >R F.
(iiib) The proof is organized in four steps
Step 1: In region B, RF − RS is increasing with respect to v2H if (7) is satisﬁed.
In region B, RS is independent of v2H. On the other hand, Proposition 1(iii) reveals that RF is
increasing in v2H: the bidding behavior of types 1L,2L does not depend on v2H whereas types
351H,2H bid more aggressively as v2H increases [as G1H(b) and G2H(b) are decreasing in v2H]. Hence
RF − RS is increasing in v2H.
Step 2: In region B, RF >R S if (4) is satisﬁed and λ1 >λ 2(1 + ln 1
λ2).
We start by proving that ˆ b and ¯ b are increasing with respect to v2L, and then show that also









> 0.S i n c eˆ b is the smallest solution of (2), it follows that ∂Z
∂b
¯ ¯





=( λ1 − λ2)ˆ b +( 1− λ1)v2H − (1 − λ2)v1H and (4) implies (1 − λ1)v2H > (1 − λ2)v1H +




> (λ1 − λ2)ˆ b +( 1− λ2)v1H +( λ2 − λ1)v1L − (1 − λ2)v1H =
(λ1 − λ2)(ˆ b − v1L) > 0, and hence ∂ˆ b
∂v2L > 0, ∂¯ b
∂v2L > 0.
From (5)-(6) we see that types 1H,2L,2H are all more aggressive as v2L increases, as in the proof
of Proposition 5(iib). Thus RF is increasing with respect to v2L,a n dl e tRF
min denote RF when v2L
takes on its minimum value, that is at v2L = v1L.A l s oRS is increasing with respect to v2L,a n d
RS = λ1v1L +(1−λ1)v1H when v2L takes on its maximum value in region B,t h a ti sa tv2L = v1H.
We prove below that RF
min >λ 1v1L +( 1− λ1)v1H, which implies that RF >R S in region B when
(4) is satisﬁed.
When v2L = v1L, the equilibrium bidding in the FPA is described in footnote 14 and it is clear that
RF
min is decreasing in v2H, as seen in the proof of Proposition 5(iia). Hence RF
min > limv2H→+∞ RF
min,
and using (23) we see that limv2H→+∞ RF
min = λ2v1L +( 1− λ2)v1H + λ2(v1H − v1L)lnλ2.T h e
inequality λ2v1L +( 1− λ2)v1H + λ2(v1H − v1L)lnλ2 >λ 1v1L +( 1− λ1)v1H is equivalent to λ1 >
λ2(1 + ln 1
λ2), which holds by assumption.
Step 3: If v2L ≤ v1H, then there exists v∗
2H [and v∗
2H >v 1H, such that (7) is satisﬁed]
such that RS >R F when v2H <v ∗
2H,a n dRF >R S when v2H >v ∗
2H.
This is immediate consequence of RS >R F if v2H = v1H [from Proposition 5(ia)], and Steps 1 and
2i nt h i sp r o o f .
Step 4: If v2L >v 1H is not too larger than v1H,t h e nt h e r ee x i s t sv∗
2H (and v∗
2H >v 1H)
such that RS >R F when v2H ∈ (v2L,v∗
2H), but RF >R S when v2H >v ∗
2H.I f c o n v e r s e l y
v2L is much larger than v1H,t h e nRF >R S for any v2H >v 2L.
We start from a proﬁle of valuations (v1L,v 1H,v 2L,v 2H) such that v2L = v1H and (7) is satisﬁed,
and consider increasing v2L, which implies that region C is entered. The increase in v2L has no
eﬀect on RF and has no eﬀect on RS,t h u sRF >R S i fa n do n l yi fv2H is suﬃciently large.
Now start from (v1L,v 1H,v 2L,v 2H) such that v2L = v1H and (4) is satisﬁed. We know from Step 2
in this proof that RF >R S. Then consider increasing v2L, which implies that region C is entered.
From the proof of Step 2 we know that the increase in v2L increases RF, and it has no eﬀect on
RS.H e n c eRF >R S.
361 2 P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
12.1 Proof of Proposition 6(i)
Consider type 1j,f o rj = L,M,H. Given that each type of bidder 2 bids v1H,f o rt y p e1 j there is
no incentive to make a bid diﬀerent from the own valuation v1j, given that v1j ≤ v1H.
Now consider type 2j,f o rj = L,M,H, and notice that bidding b = v1H yields him payoﬀ
v2j − v1H > 0,w h e r e a su2j(b)=0if b<v 1L, u2j(b)=λL(v2j − b) if b ∈ [v1L,v 1M),a n du2j(b)=
(λL+λM)(v2j −b) if b ∈ [v1M,v 1H).G i v e nt h a tλHv2L+(λL+λM)v1M ≥ v1H and (λM +λH)v2L+
λLv1L ≥ v1H we infer that u2j(b) ≤ v2j − v1H for any b<v 1H.
12.2 Proof of Proposition 6(ii)
We use vL,v M,v H +α to denote the valuations of bidder 1, and vL,v M,v H to denote the valuations
of bidder 2. In Steps 1-3 in this proof we consider the case of a small α>0.
First we show that there exists a BNE in the FPA characterized by three bids b1,b 2,b 3 such
that (i) vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3;( i i )1L bids vL, 1M and 1H play mixed strategies with support (vL,b 2]
for 1M and [b2,b 3] for 1H; (iii) 2L bids vL, 2M and 2H play mixed strategies with support [vL,b 1]




< 0 for this BNE, and thus RF is smaller
for a small α>0 than in the case of α =0 .
12.2.1 Step 1: Characterization of the equilibrium mixed strategies
Given the supports for the mixed strategies described above, we obtain the following indiﬀerence
conditions for types 1M,1 H,2 M,2 H.W eu s eGij to denote the c.d.f. of the mixed strategy of type
ij,f o ri =1 ,2 and j = L,M,H.
Type 1M:
(vM − b)[λL + λMG2M(b)] = (λL + λM)(vM − b1) for any b ∈ (vL,b 1] (28)
(vM − b)[λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] = (λL + λM)(vM − b1) for any b ∈ [b1,b 2] (29)
Type 1H:
(vH + α − b)[λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] = vH + α − b3 for any b ∈ [b2,b 3] (30)
Type 2M:
(vM − b)[λL + λMG1M(b)] = λL(vM − vL) for any b ∈ [vL,b 1] (31)
Type 2H:
(vH − b)[λL + λMG1M(b)] = vH − b3 for any b ∈ [b1,b 2] (32)
(vH − b)[λL + λM + λHG1H(b)] = vH − b3 for any b ∈ [b2,b 3] (33)
37Equilibrium rules out mass points at any b>v L, thus each c.d.f. needs to be continuous at




λL(vH − b1)(vM − vL)=( vM − b1)(vH − b3) (34)





(λL + λM)(vM − b1)(vH + α − b2)=( vH + α − b3)(vM − b2) (35)
Finally, G1H(b2) needs to be 0, and then (33) yields
b3 = λHvH +( λL + λM)b2 (36)
Inserting (36) into (34) and (35) we obtain two equations in the unknowns b1,b 2:
λL(vH − b1)(vM − vL) − (λL + λM)(vM − b1)(vH − b2)=0 (37)
(λL + λM)(vM − b1)(vH + α − b2) − ((λL + λM)(vH − b2)+α)(vM − b2)=0 (38)
The system of equations (36)-(38) characterizes the equilibrium values of b1,b 2,b 3. In the next step
we prove that vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3 for a small α>0, and here we show that these inequalities imply
that no incentive to deviate exists for any type, that is the strategies we have described constitute
aB N E .
First we notice that the range of bids submitted by bidder 1 and by bidder 2 is [vL,b 3],t h u s
f o rn ot y p ei ti sp r o ﬁtable to deviate with a bid below vL or above b3. Second, it is useful to take
into account the following fact (the proof is immediate after diﬀerentiating u with respect to b):
For given α1 > 0, α2 > 0, the function u(b)=α1−b
α2−b,d e ﬁned for b ∈ [0,α 2),
is increasing if α1 >α 2,i sd e c r e a s i n gi fα1 <α 2.
(39)
Type 1L.T y p e1 L bids vL with probability one, which gives him payoﬀ zero. Since u1L(b) < 0 if
he bids b ∈ (vL,b 3], he has no incentive to bid in (vL,b 3].
Type 1M.T y p e1 M plays a mixed strategy with support (vL,b 2] and his payoﬀ is (λL+λM)(vM −
b1). If instead he bids b ∈ (b2,b 3],t h e nu1M(b)=( vH + α − b3) vM−b
vH+α−b [in view of (30)], which is
decreasing in b since vM <v H + α.T h i sg i v e st y p e1 M no incentive to bid in (b2,b 3]. Regarding
b = vL,n o t i c et h a tG2M(vL) > 0 since, as we prove in Step 2, b1 <v L + λM∆
λL+λM . Therefore bidding
b = vL implies for type 1M a positive probability of tying with type 2M (with a probability of
winning in this case equal to 1
2) and therefore a discrete reduction in the probability of winning
with respect to bids slightly above vL. This makes bidding vL an unproﬁtable deviation for 1M.
Type 1H.T y p e1 H p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[b2,b 3] and his payoﬀ is vH + α − b3.I f
instead he bids b ∈ (vL,b 2),t h e nu1H(b)=( λL + λM)(vM − b1)vH+α−b
vM−b [in view of (28) and (29)],
which is increasing in b since vH + α>v M. Therefore type 1H has no incentive to bid in (vL,b 2).
T h es a m ea r g u m e n td e s c r i b e df o rt y p e1 M reveal that the bid b = vL is an unproﬁtable deviation
for 1H.
38Type 2L.T y p e2 L bids vL with probability one, which gives him payoﬀ zero. Since u2L(b) < 0 if
he bids b ∈ (vL,b 3], he has no incentive to bid in (vL,b 3].
Type 2M.T y p e2 M p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[vL,b 1] and his payoﬀ is λL(vM −vL).I f
instead he bids b ∈ (b1,b 3],t h e nu2M(b)=( vH −b3)vM−b
vH−b [in view of (32)-(33)], which is decreasing
in b since vM <v H.T h i sg i v e st y p e2M no incentive to bid in (b1,b 3].
Type 2H.T y p e2H plays a mixed strategy with support [b1,b 3] and his payoﬀ is vH −b3.I fi n s t e a d
he bids b ∈ [vL,b 1),t h e nu2H(b)=λL(vM −vL) vH−b
vM−b [in view of (31)], which is increasing in b since
vH >v L.T h i sg i v e st y p e2H no incentive to bid in [vL,b 1).
12.2.2 Step 2: For a small α>0, the inequalities vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3 hold
In the following we use ∆ ≡ vM −vL > 0 and t ≡ 1
∆(vH −vM) > 0.T h ev a l u e so fb1,b 2,b 3 depend
on α, and therefore we write b1(α),b 2(α),b 3(α).W h e n α =0we obtain the symmetric setting,
with b1(0) = b2(0) = vL + λM∆
λL+λM , b3(0) = vL +( λM + λH + λHt)∆.W ei n v e s t i g a t eh o wb1,b 2,b 3
depend on α,f o ras m a l lα>0, by applying the implicit function theorem to (37)-(38) at α =0 ,
b1 = b2 = vL + λM∆
λL+λM ;i nt h i sw a yw eo b t a i nb0
1(0),b 0
2(0),b 0
3(0). To this purpose we denote the left
hand sides of (37), (38) with f1(b1,b 2,α),f 2(b1,b 2,α), respectively. Then we obtain
∂f1
∂b1
=( λL + λM)(vH − b2) − λL∆,
∂f1
∂b2






= −(λL + λM)(vH + α − b2),
∂f2
∂b2
=( λL + λM)(vH + b1 − 2b2)+α,
∂f2
∂α
= b2 − (λL + λM)b1 − λHvM










(λL + λM)∆tλ L∆

















Using (36) we see that b0
3(0) =
(λL+λM)λHλLt














We deﬁne Gi(b) as λLGiL(b)+λMGiM(b)+λHGiH(b) for i =1 ,2,s ot h a tG(b) ≡ G1(b)G2(b) is





[λL + λMG1M(b)][λL + λMG2M(b)] = λL(λL + λM)
∆[vM−b1(α)]
(vM−b)2 if b ∈ [vL,b 1(α))
[λL + λMG1M(b)][λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] = (λL + λM)
[vH−b3(α)][vM−b1(α)]
(vM−b)(vH−b) if b ∈ [b1(α),b 2(α))
[λL + λM + λHG1H(b)][λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] =
[vH−b3(α)][vH+α−b3(α)]


















[vH − b3(α)][vM − b1(α)]





[vH − b3(α)][vH + α − b3(α)]
(vH − b)(vH + α − b)
db





















• The derivative of
R b2(α)
b1(α) (λL + λM)
[vH−b3(α)][vM−b1(α)]
(vM−b)(vH−b) db with respect to α is
(λL + λM){
[vH − b3(α)][vM − b1(α)]











3(α)[vM − b1(α)] + b0
1(α)[vH − b3(α)]
(vM − b)(vH − b)
db}
and at α =0it boils down to
(λL+λM)λLλH
λL+tλL+tλM .




(vH−b)(vH+α−b) db with respect to α is
b0
3(α) −
[vH − b3(α)][vH + α − b3(α)]b0
2(α)




{[vH − b3(α)][1 − 2b0
3(α)] − αb0
3(α)}(vH + α − b) − [vH − b3(α)][vH + α − b3(α)]
(vH − b)(vH + α − b)2 db























(λL + tλL + tλM)
2 −
(λL + λM)λLλH




2 t2 + λ2
L
2(λL + tλL + tλM)
2
= −λH
λH (λL + λM)
2 (t − λL
λL+λM )2 +2 λ2
LλM
2(λL + tλL + tλM)
2 < 0
On the other hand, RS does not change if α increases from 0 to a positive value, thus RS >R F for
as m a l lα>0.
4012.2.4 Step 4: The case of a small reduction in v1H
Consider the symmetric setting such that v1L = v2L = vL, v1M = v2M = vM, v1H = v2H = vH;
then RF = vL +( λM + λH)2∆ + λ2
H∆t.W e n e e d t o p r o v e t h a t RF is larger in this case than if
v1H is reduced to vH − α,f o ras m a l lα>0. In order to prove the latter property, consider ﬁrst
the symmetric setting in which v1L = v2L = vL, v1M = v2M = vM, v1H = v2H = vH − α;t h e n
RF = vL +(λM +λH)2∆+λ2
H(∆t−α). Now increase v2H from vH −α to vH.B yS t e p s1 - 3i nt h i s
proof, the eﬀect is that RF is reduced below vL +( λM + λH)2∆ + λ2
H(∆t − α), which guarantees
that RF is smaller than vL +( λM + λH)2∆ + λ2
H∆t.
12.3 Proof of Proposition 6(iii)
In this proof we use vL,v M,v H to denote the valuations of bidder 1, and vL + yα,vM,v H − α to
denote the valuations of bidder 2, for an arbitrary y>0 and a small α>0.
First we show that there exists a BNE in the FPA characterized by three bids b1,b 2,b 3 such that
(i) vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3;( i i )1L bids vL, 1M and 1H play mixed strategies with support (vL,b 2] for 1M
and [b2,b 3] for 1H; (iii) 2L bids vL, 2M and 2H play mixed strategies with supports [vL,b 1] for 2M












Thus RF <R S for a small α>0.
12.3.1 Step 1: Characterization of the equilibrium mixed strategies
Given the supports for the mixed strategies described above, we obtain the following indiﬀerence
conditions for types 1M,1 H,2 M,2 H.W eu s eGij to denote the c.d.f. of the mixed strategy of type
ij,f o ri =1 ,2 and j = L,M,H.
Type 1M:
(vM − b)[λL + λMG2M(b)] = (λL + λM)(vM − b1) for any b ∈ [vL,b 1] (40)
(vM − b)[λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] = (λL + λM)(vM − b1) for any b ∈ [b1,b 2] (41)
Type 1H:
(vH − b)[λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] = vH − b3 for any b ∈ [b2,b 3] (42)
Type 2M:
(vM − b)[λL + λMG1M(b)] = λL(vM − vL) for any b ∈ [vL,b 1] (43)
Type 2H:
(vH − α − b)[λL + λMG1M(b)] = vH − α − b3 for any b ∈ [b1,b 2] (44)
(vH − α − b)[λL + λM + λHG1H(b)] = vH − α − b3 for any b ∈ [b2,b 3] (45)
41Equilibrium rules out mass points at any b>v L, thus each c.d.f. needs to be continuous at




λL(vH − α − b1)(vM − vL) − (vM − b1)(vH − α − b3)=0 (46)





(λL + λM)(vM − b1)(vH − b2) − (vH − b3)(vM − b2) (47)
Finally, G1H(b2) needs to be 0, and then (45) yields
b3 = λH(vH − α)+( λL + λM)b2 (48)
Inserting (48) into (46) and (47) we obtain two equations in the unknowns b1,b 2:
λL(vH − α − b1)(vM − vL) − (λL + λM)(vM − b1)(vH − α − b2)=0 (49)
(λL + λM)(vM − b1)(vH − b2) − ((1 − λH)(vH − b2)+λHα)(vM − b2)=0 (50)
The system of equations (48)-(50) characterizes the equilibrium values of b1,b 2,b 3.I ti si m p o r t a n t
to notice that the valuation of type 2L, vL + yα, plays no role. In the next step we prove that
vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3 for a small α>0, and here we show that these inequalities imply that no
incentive to deviate exists for any type, that is the strategies we have described constitute a BNE.
First we notice that the range of bids submitted by bidder 1 and by bidder 2 is [vL,b 3],t h u s
f o rn ot y p ei ti sp r o ﬁtable to deviate with a bid below vL or above b3. Second, it is useful to take
into account fact (39).
Type 1L.T y p e1 L bids vL with probability one, which gives him payoﬀ zero. Since u1L(b) < 0 if
he bids b ∈ (vL,b 3], he has no incentive to bid in (vL,b 3].
Type 1M.T y p e1 M plays a mixed strategy with support (vL,b 2] and his payoﬀ is (λL+λM)(vM −
b1). If instead he bids b ∈ (b2,b 3],t h e nu1M(b)=( vH−b3)vM−b
vH−b [in view of (42)], which is decreasing
in b since vM <v H.T h i sg i v e st y p e1 M no incentive to bid in (b2,b 3]. Regarding b = vL,n o t i c e
that G2M(vL) > 0 since, as we prove in Step 2, b1 <v L+ λM∆
λL+λM . Therefore bidding b = vL implies
for type 1M a positive probability of tying with type 2M (with a probability of winning in this case
equal to 1
2) and therefore a discrete reduction in the probability of winning with respect to bids
slightly above vL. This makes bidding vL an unproﬁtable deviation for 1M.
Type 1H.T y p e1 H plays a mixed strategy with support [b2,b 3] and his payoﬀ is vH −b3.I fi n s t e a d
he bids b ∈ (vL,b 2),t h e nu1H(b)=( λL + λM)(vM − b1) vH−b
vM−b [in view of (40) and (41)], which is
increasing in b since vH >v M.T h e r e f o r e t y p e 1H has no incentive to bid in (vL,b 2).T h e s a m e
argument described for type 1M reveal that the bid b = vL is an unproﬁtable deviation for 1H.
Type 2L.T y p e2 L bids vL with probability one, which gives him payoﬀ λLyα. If instead he bids
b ∈ (vL,v L + yα],t h e nu2L(b)=λL(vM − vL)
vL+yα−b
vM−b [in view of (43)], which is decreasing in b
42since vL + yα < vM.H e n c e2 L has no incentive to bid in (vL,v L + yα],a n du2L(b) < 0 if he bids
b ∈ (vL + yα,b3].
Type 2M.T y p e2 M p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[vL,b 1] and his payoﬀ is λL(vM − vL).
If instead he bids b ∈ (b1,b 3],t h e nu2M(b)=( vH − α − b3) vM−b
vH−α−b [in view of (44)-(45)], which is
decreasing in b since vM <v H − α.T h i sg i v e st y p e2M no incentive to bid in (b1,b 3].
Type 2H.T y p e2H p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[b1,b 3] and his payoﬀ is vH − α − b3.I f
instead he bids b ∈ [vL,b 1),t h e nu2H(b)=λL(vM −vL)vH−α−b
vM−b [in view of (43)], which is increasing
in b since vH >v M.T h i sg i v e st y p e2H no incentive to bid in [vL,b 1).
12.3.2 Step 2: For a small α>0,w eh a v evL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3
In the following we use ∆ ≡ vM −vL > 0 and t ≡ 1
∆(vH −vM) > 0.T h ev a l u e so fb1,b 2,b 3 depend
on α, and therefore we write b1(α),b 2(α),b 3(α).W h e n α =0we obtain the symmetric setting,
with b1(0) = b2(0) = vL + λM∆
λL+λM , b3(0) = vL +( λM + λH + tλH)∆.W ei n v e s t i g a t eh o wb1,b 2,b 3
depend on α,f o ras m a l lα>0, by applying the implicit function theorem to (49)-(50) at α =0 ,
b1 = b2 = vL + λM∆
λL+λM ;i nt h i sw a yw eo b t a i nb0
1(0),b 0
2(0),b 0
3(0). To this purpose we denote the left
hand sides of (49),(50) with f1(b1,b 2,α),f 2(b1,b 2,α), respectively. Then we obtain
∂f1
∂b1
=( 1 − λH)(vH − α − b2) − λL∆,
∂f1
∂b2
=( 1− λH)(vM − b1),
∂f1
∂α
=( 1− λH)(vM − b1) − λL∆
∂f2
∂b1
= −(1 − λH)(vH − b2),
∂f2
∂b2
=( 1− λH)(vH + b1 − 2b2)+λHα,
∂f2
∂α
= −λH(vM − b2)










(λL + λM)∆tλ L∆

















Using (48) we see that b0





(λL+tλL+tλM)2 .I n n e x t
step we use b0
1(0),b 0
2(0),b 0










We deﬁne Gi(b) as λLGiL(b)+λMGiM(b)+λHGiH(b) for i =1 ,2,s ot h a tG(b) ≡ G1(b)G2(b) is





[λL + λMG1M(b)][λL + λMG2M(b)] = λL(λL + λM)vM−vL
vM−b
vM−b1(α)
vM−b if b ∈ [vL,b 1(α))




vM−b if b ∈ [b1(α),b 2(α))


























vH − α − b3(α)






vH − α − b3(α)




























vH−α−b (λL + λM)
vM−b1(α)
















and at α =0it boils down to
(λL+λM)λLλH
λL+tλL+tλM .






vH−b db with respect to α is
b0
3(α) −
[vH − α − b3(α)][vH − b3(α)]







3(α)+[ b3(α) − vH][1 + 2b0
3(α)]}(vH − α − b)+[ vH − α − b3(α)][vH − b3(α)]
(vH − b)(vH − α − b)2 db
















t2(1 − λH)2 + λL(λL + tλL + tλM)




(λL + tλL + tλM)
2 −
(1 − λH)λLλH
λL + tλL + tλM
−λH
(1 − 3λL − 3λM)(λ2
L +( 1− λH)2t2) − 4λL(1 − λH)2t




L (3λH +2 λM)+λH(1 − λH)(2λL +3 ( 1− λH)t)t









It is straightforward to see that
RS = λLvL + λMλL(vL + yα)+λM(λM + λH)vM + λHλL(vL + yα)+λHλMvM + λ2
H(vH − α)
= vL + ((1 − λL)2 + tλ2
H)∆ +( yλL(1 − λL) − λ2
H)α
and thus dRS






> 0 is equivalent to
yλL(1 − λL) − λ2
H + λH
λ2
L (3λH +2 λM)+λH(1 − λH)(2λL +3 ( 1− λH)t)t
2(λL + tλL + tλM)
2 > 0












> 0 for any y ≥ 0.
12.4 Proof of Proposition 6(iv)
In this proof we use vL,v M,v H to denote the valuations of bidder 1 and vL +α,vM +α,vH + α to
denote the valuations of bidder 2, for a small α>0.
First we show that there exists a BNE in the FPA characterized by four bids b1,b 2,b 3,b 4 such
that (i) vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3 <b 4;( i i )1L bids vL, 1M and 1H play mixed strategies with support
[vL,b 2] for 1M and [b2,b 4] for 1H; (iii) 2L, 2M, 2H play mixed strategies with support [vL,b 1]













α=0.T h u sRF <R S for a small α>0.
12.4.1 Step 1: Characterization of the equilibrium mixed strategies
Given the supports for the mixed strategies described above, we obtain the following indiﬀerence
conditions for types 1M,1 H,2 L,2 M,2 H.W eu s eGij to denote the c.d.f. of the mixed strategy of
type ij,f o ri =1 ,2 and j = L,M,H.
Type 1M:
(vM − b)λLG2L(b)=λL(vM − b1) for any b ∈ [vL,b 1] (51)
(vM − b)[λL + λMG2M(b)] = λL(vM − b1) for any b ∈ (b1,b 2] (52)
Type 1H:
(vH − b)[λL + λMG2M(b)] = vH − b4 for any b ∈ [b2,b 3] (53)
(vH − b)[λL + λM + λHG2H(b)] = vH − b4 for any b ∈ (b3,b 4] (54)
Type 2L:
(vL + α − b)[λL + λMG1M(b)] = λL(vL + α − vL) for any b ∈ [vL,b 1] (55)
45Type 2M:
(vM + α − b)[λL + λMG1M(b)] = (λL + λM)(vM + α − b2) for any b ∈ [b1,b 2] (56)
(vM + α − b)[λL + λM + λHG1H(b)] = (λL + λM)(vM + α − b2) for any b ∈ (b2,b 3] (57)
Type 2H:
(vH + α − b)[λL + λM + λHG1H(b)] = vH + α − b4 for any b ∈ [b3,b 4] (58)
Equilibrium rules out mass points at any b>v L, thus each c.d.f. needs to be continuous at





λLα(vM + α − b1)=( λL + λM)(vM + α − b2)(vL + α − b1) (59)





(λL + λM)(vM + α − b2)(vH + α − b3)=( vM + α − b3)(vH + α − b4) (60)




λL(vM − b1)(vH − b2)=( vH − b4)(vM − b2) (61)
Finally, G2H(b3) needs to be 0 and then (54) yields
b4 = λHvH +( λL + λM)b3 (62)
Inserting (62) into (59)-(61) we obtain three equations in the unknowns b1,b 2,b 3:
λLα(vM + α − b1) − (λL + λM)(vM + α − b2)(vL + α − b1)=0(63)
(λL + λM)(vM + α − b2)(vH + α − b3) − (vM + α − b3)((1 − λH)(vH − b3)+α)=0(64)
λL(vM − b1)(vH − b2) − (λL + λM)(vH − b3)(vM − b2)=0(65)
The system of equations (62)-(65) characterizes the equilibrium values of b1,b 2,b 3,b 4. In the next
step we prove that vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3 <b 4 for a small α>0, and here we show that these
inequalities imply that no incentive to deviate exists for any type, that is the strategies we have
described constitute a BNE.
First notice that the range of bids submitted by bidder 1 and by bidder 2 is [vL,b 4],t h u sf o r
no type it is proﬁtable to deviate with a bid below vL or above b4. Second, it is useful to take into
account fact (39).
Type 1L.T y p e1 L bids vL with probability one, which gives him payoﬀ zero. Since u1L(b) < 0 if
bids b ∈ (vL,b 4], he has no incentive to bid in (vL,b 4].
46Type 1M.T y p e 1 M p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[vL,b 2] and his payoﬀ is λL(vM − b1).
If instead he bids b ∈ (b2,b 4],t h e nu1M(b)=( vH − b4)vM−b
vH−b [in view of (53) and (54)], which is
decreasing in b since vM <v H.T h i sg i v e st y p e1 M no incentive to bid in (b2,b 4].
Type 1H.T y p e1H plays a mixed strategy with support [b2,b 4] and his payoﬀ is vH −b4.I fi n s t e a d
he bids b ∈ [vL,b 2),t h e nu1H(b)=λL(vM − b1) vH−b
vM−b [in view of (51) and (52)], which is increasing
in b since vH >v M.T h i sg i v e st y p e1H no incentive to bid in [vL,b 2).
Type 2L.T y p e2L p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[vL,b 1] and his payoﬀ is λLα.I fi n s t e a d
he bids b ∈ (b1,b 3],t h e nu2L(b)=( λL + λM)(vM + α − b2) vL+α−b
vM+α−b [in view of (56) and (57)],
which is decreasing in b since vL + α<v M + α.M o r e o v e r , i f 2L bids b ∈ (b3,b 4] then u2L(b)=
(vH + α − b4) vL+α−b
vH+α−b, which is decreasing in b since vL + α<v H + α. Therefore type 2L has no
incentive to bid in (b1,b 4].
Type 2M.T y p e2M plays a mixed strategy with support [b1,b 3] and his payoﬀ is (λL+λM)(vM+α−
b2). If instead he bids b ∈ [vL,b 1),t h e nu2M(b)=λLαvM+α−b
vL+α−b [in view of (55)], which is increasing
in b since vM +α>v L+α.M o r e o v e r ,i f2 M bids b ∈ (b3,b 4] then u2M(b)=( vH +α−b4)vM+α−b
vH+α−b [in
view of (58)], which is decreasing in b since vM + α<v H + α. Therefore type 2M has no incentive
to bid in [vL,b 1) or in (b3,b 4].
Type 2H.T y p e2H p l a y sam i x e ds t r a t e g yw i t hs u p p o r t[b3,b 4] and his payoﬀ is vH + α − b4.I f
instead he bids b ∈ [vL,b 1],t h e nu2H(b)=λLαvH+α−b
vL+α−b [in view of (55)], which is increasing in b since
vH +α>v L +α.M o r e o v e r ,i f2H bids b ∈ (b1,b 3),t h e nu2H(b)=( λL +λM)(vM +α −b2) vH+α−b
vM+α−b
[in view of (56) and (57)], which is increasing in b since vH + α>v M + α. Therefore type 2H has
no incentive to bid in [vL,b 3).
12.4.2 Step 2: For a small α>0, the inequalities vL <b 1 <b 2 <b 3 <b 4 hold
In the following we use ∆ ≡ vM−vL > 0 and t ≡ 1
∆(vH−vM) > 0.T h ev a l u e so fb1,b 2,b 3,b 4 depend
on α, and therefore we write b1(α),b 2(α),b 3(α),b 4(α).W h e nα =0we obtain the symmetric setting,
with b1(0) = vL, b2(0) = b3(0) = vL+ λM∆
λL+λM , b4(0) = vL+(λM +λH +tλH)∆.W ei n v e s t i g a t eh o w
b1,b 2,b 3,b 4 depend on α,f o ras m a l lα>0, by applying the implicit function theorem to (63)-(65) at
α =0 , b1 = vL, b2 = b3 = vL+ λM∆




4(0). To this purpose
we denote the left hand sides of (63),(64),(65) with f1(b1,b 2,b 3,α),f 2(b1,b 2,b 3,α),f 3(b1,b 2,b 3,α),
respectively. Then we obtain
∂f1
∂b1
= λMα +( λL + λM)(vM − b2),
∂f1
∂b2












= −(λL + λM)(vH + α − b3),
∂f2
∂b3
=( 1 − λH)(vH + b2 − 2b3)+α,
∂f2
∂α
= b3 − λH(2α + vM) − (1 − λH)b2
∂f3
∂b1
= −λL(vH − b2),
∂f3
∂b2
= −λL(vM − b1)+( λL + λM)(vH − b3)
∂f3
∂b3






















0 −(λL + tλL + tλM)∆ (λL + tλL + tλM)∆
−
λL(λL+tλL+tλM)




























Using (62) we see that b0
4(0) =
(λL+λM)λLλHt










1(0) does not reveal that b1 >v L. To this purpose we diﬀerentiate (63) twice








Evaluating (66) at α =0yields (λL+λM)[vM −b2(0)]b00
1(0)−2λM +2(λL+λM)b0






(λL+tλL+tλM)2) > 0. As a consequence b1(α) >v L for a small α>0.




We deﬁne Gi(b) as λLGiL(b)+λMGiM(b)+λHGiH(b) for i =1 ,2,s ot h a tG(b)=G1(b)G2(b) is
the c.d.f. of the winning bid. In particular, from (51)-(58) we obtain
G(b)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






vM−b if b ∈ [vL,b 1(α))




vM−b if b ∈ [b1(α),b 2(α))




vH−b if b ∈ [b2(α),b 3(α))






















(λL + λM)λL[vM + α − b2(α)][vM − b1(α)]





(λL + λM)[vM + α − b2(α)][vH − b4(α)]




[vH + α − b4(α)][vH − b4(α)]
(vH + α − b)(vH − b)
db



















[vM − b1(α) − αb0
1(α)](vL + α − b) − α[vM − b1(α)]
(vM − b)(vL + α − b)2 db)
and at α =0it boils down to 0.















































and at α =0it boils down to
(λL+λM)λHλL
λL+tλL+tλM .







[vH + α − b4(α)][vH − b4(α)]






{[vH − b4(α)][1 − 2b0
4(α)] − αb0
4(α)}(vH + α − b) − [vH + α − b4(α)][vH − b4(α)]
(vH − b)(vH + α − b)2 db


















(λL + tλL + tλM)2 −
λ2
M(λL + tλL + tλM)2 − 2λ3
LλH
2(λL + tλL + tλM)2 −
(λL + λM)λHλL
λL + tλL + tλM
−λ2
H
(λL + λM)2t2 + λ2
L





2 t2 +2 λL (λL + λM)(λ2
H − λ2
M)t − λ2
L (1 − λL)
2







It is straightforward to see that
RS = λLvL + λMλL(vL + α)+λM(λM + λH)vM + λHλL(vL + α)+λHλM(vM + α)+λ2
HvH
= vL +( ( λM + λH)
2 + λ2
Ht)∆ +( λHλL + λLλM + λHλM)α
and thus dRS





> 0 is equivalent to
λHλL + λLλM + λHλM +
(λ2
H + λ2




2(λL + tλL + tλM)2 > 0















L) ,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v e .
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